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SCHOOLING MIRANDA: POLICING
INTERROGATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY SCHOOLHOUSE
Paul Holland*
INTRODUCTION
Walking the halls of America's public schools today, one
should not be surprised to see a police officer. Officers' regular
activities at schools include making arrests, teaching class, and
talking with students (the troubled and the curious). The
presence of police in schools has changed more than just the
frequency and nature of interactions between students and police.
School administrators have altered their activities to collaborate
2with police officers. Unsurprisingly, these changes have had an
impact beyond the walls of the schools. Walking the halls of
America's juvenile courts, one should not be surprised to see
young people facing charges arising out of incidents at school.
This article addresses one particular aspect of this
transformation of the educational and juvenile justice systems:
the applicability of the Miranda rules to the interrogation of
* Assistant Clinical Professor, Seattle University School of Law. LL.M.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1996, J.D., New York University, 1991.
1. I thank Janet Ainsworth, Anne Enquist, Kristin Henning, Randy Hertz, John
Mitchell, and Wallace Mlyniec for reviewing drafts of this article and providing
invaluable feedback. I also thank Laurie Sleeper for her assistance with the
diagrams contained herein.
2. See PETER FINN ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF 19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER
(SRO) PROGRAMS, 53 (2005) [hereinafter CASE STUDIES] (describing a school at which
"SRO's work closely with school administrators in matters that may involve an
arrest" and at which officers and administrators "refer cases to each other 8 - 10
times a month and collaborate on solving them"); see also In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d 25, 30
(Tex. App. 2001), in which a principal described how a working relationship
established with a school police officer over years of collaboration guided him in
questioning a student suspected of bringing a gun to school ("[Wiorking together for
four years, we just, you know, looked at each other and kind of just knew intuitively
that Officer Cox's presence there was not good and possibly [the student] would not
cooperate.").
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students at school.3
To speak generally about the role of police in schools is to
speak inaccurately. With respect to many American schools
today, the epithet "police-dominated atmosphere," taken from the
Miranda opinion, would be hyperbolic.4 Principals and teachers
have always asserted authority over students as part of their
responsibility to educate, and in many schools the authority
which school administrators wield retains this tutelary
character.5 There are, however, many schools where the police
have asserted their authority with all the force at their disposal.
A 2005 report described that "[diozens of incidents in which police
officers have used electric stun guns to subdue unruly students
have led school officials around the USA to restrict the use of the
devices on campus."
6
A school with a traditionally tutelary principal and one with
a taser-firing officer stand at opposite ends of a spectrum with
respect to the degree and nature of force to which students may
be subjected. Miranda claims at either end are fairly easy to
address. A principal, acting alone and without invoking or
outwardly benefiting from the authority of any law enforcement
officer may question a student without complying with Miranda's
requirements. A student's answers to such questions will be
3. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-74 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled
that before engaging in custodial interrogation, law enforcement officers must inform
suspects that they have the right to remain silent, that any statements they make
can be used against them, that they have the right to consult with counsel and to
have counsel present during interrogation and that if they cannot afford counsel,
counsel will be provided for them.
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
5. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (noting that
court has previously emphasized that "the nature" of the State's power over
schoolchildren "is custodial and tutelary").
6. Donna Leinwand, Schools Restrict Use of Tasers, USA TODAY, June 3, 2005,
avaiable at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-06-03-taser-x.htm?POE=NE
WISUA (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). See also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Mich., Lawsuit Filed Against Detroit Police and Detroit Public Schools
(June 10, 2004), http://www.aclumich.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid
=360 (last visit-ed Apr. 18, 2006) (announcing litigation on behalf of Detroit high
school students and their families challenging the practice of the Detroit Public
Schools, in conjunction with the Detroit Police Department, of conducting mass
searches of students); Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.'s "Special Needs" Doctrine in
an Era of School-Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 292 (2004)
(describing a "massive" and unsuccessful search of tens of students for drugs at a
South Carolina high school where police officers armed with guns and drug-sniffing
dogs and ordered more than 100 students to kneel for a search).
[Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Loy. L. Rev. 40 2006
Miranda and School Interrogation
admissible at subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings. On
the other hand, a police officer who acts in traditional law-
enforcement mode-for example arranging for a student to be
removed from class, handcuffed, and placed in a closed office
alone with the officer-must advise the student of her rights
before questioning the student. If the officer fails to do so, any
statements made by the student will not be admissible in juvenile
or criminal proceedings. The challenges for courts will come from
the array of cases that fall between these two extremes. The
modern alignment between educational and law enforcement
authorities requires courts to determine whether and when a
principal's collaboration with police renders the principal's
questioning subject to Miranda and how an officer's part-time
assignment at the front of a crowded classroom should affect the
analysis of the officer's subsequent interrogation of a lone student
in a closed office.
The Supreme Court has never issued an opinion addressing
the application of Miranda's rules to interrogation occurring at a
school. The Court has ruled, however, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
that school officials acting in furtherance of their educational
responsibilities have greater latitude under the Fourth
Amendment than law enforcement officers do to search students
and their property.7 Many courts have simplistically combined
T.L.O. and Miranda and assumed that Miranda does not apply to
questioning by school officials unless those officials are acting as
agents of law enforcement. 8 These opinions have not addressed,
often because it was unnecessary on the facts presented, the
extent to which the developments in school-law-enforcement
collaboration have rendered the T.L.O. framework obsolete.
This article is not the first to suggest that modern school-
policing practices have undermined T.L.O.'s continued vitality.9
7. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985). The Court "did not
consider the level of suspicion necessary when school officials act 'in conjunction with
or at the behest of law enforcement agencies' because the school administrator acted
alone in searching [the defendant's] belongings." Michael Pinard, From the
Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public
School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1080-
81 (2003).
8. See Part II.A. infra for a discussion of these cases.
9. See Kagan, supra note 6, at 294 (noting that "the increasingly complex
relationship between schools and law enforcement requires revision" of the T.L.O.
doctrine); Pinard, supra note 7, at 1080-82 (noting that T.L.O. provides no guidance
on how courts should treat the increased presence of law enforcement in public
2006]
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Unsurprisingly, the work that has addressed this subjecthas
developed within the framework of the Fourth Amendment. This
article directs attention to the manner in which modern practices
illuminate the fallacies of the doctrinally unsound extension of
T.L.O. into Fifth Amendment analysis. Courts' frequent and
superficial T.L.O. gloss on the Miranda requirements ignores
important distinctions between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. In those cases that do not exempt all school-sited
questioning from Miranda's reach, courts place too much weight
on the job title of the questioner without taking account of the full
context in which the questioning took place. 10  Rather than
offering persuasive analysis, some courts have summarily
dismissed the suggestion that Miranda has any meaningful role
to play in addressing school-sited interrogation.1 Judges present
this dismissal as a necessary act of self-restraint in which they
are refusing to add the "burden" of Miranda compliance on school
administrators or the law enforcement professionals with whom
they collaborate.
This rhetoric is misleading in that it (1) overstates the effect
of recognizing Miranda's appropriate scope in the school
interrogation setting and (2) suggests that those raising or
recognizing Miranda claims on behalf of interrogated students
would be introducing the criminal justice framework into the
school setting. Having decided to coordinate educational and law
enforcement practices, educators and law enforcement officials
have imposed the criminal justice paradigm on students' behavior
at school. This article does not assess the legitimacy of this
coordination but instead proposes a framework for appreciating
schools); Jacqueline Stefkovich & Judith Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in Public
Schools: Student Citizens in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25, 25-26 (1999)
(arguing that the T.L.O. decision did not sufficiently address the complex nature of
the public school system in relation to the historical background of the Fourth
Amendment and its requirements of law enforcement).
10. See, e.g., M.H. v. State, 851 So. 2d 233, 233-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The
court issued a conclusory one-paragraph ruling that the presence of an officer at the
principal's interrogation of a student was not enough to render Miranda applicable.
Id. That rule is unobjectionable, but the assumption that the principal's action was
not cloaked in authority shared with the police officer is faulty.
11. See, e.g., State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(reasoning that "[e]stablishing a blanket rule that excludes the presence of a police
officer whenever a school administrator questions a student unless Miranda
warnings are given turns a blind eye to the threatening world surrounding our
schools"). But see In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 2002) (requiring Miranda
warnings).
[Vol. 52
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and appropriately regulating its effects on the lives, rights, and
power of the principal parties -students, educators, and police
officers. This article shares with the T.L.O. opinion the concern
that decisions involving the rights of students at school be rooted
in an accurate appreciation of school life. This article moves
beyond T.L.O. and its progeny, however, by confronting the
complexity of modern school-law-enforcement collaborations, as
seen in a recently published study of the activities of School
Resource Officers (SROs) from across the country.
12
A categorical approach to Miranda's application to school-
based interrogation (e.g., one that creates a rule for all schools or
that makes the questioner's job title dispositive) ignores the
diversity of approaches within current school-based law
enforcement practice and disregards the intimidating aspects of
many encounters students have with law enforcement officers
and the school administrators who work with them. This article
directs courts to base their application of Miranda on an explicit
and contextually sound consideration of the relationships among
students, officers and administrators. This article argues that
Miranda applies when a state agent questions a student under
circumstances in which it would be reasonable for the student to
believe that she is the subject of law enforcement authority,
regardless of whether a law enforcement officer conducts the
questioning.13 The determination that Miranda applies is not
tantamount to a decision that the student was in custody. It is
merely a prelude to the custody inquiry. This article does not call
for any change in the prevailing definition of custody, but
proposes a structure for that inquiry that takes into account the
special features of the school setting.
12. The study, funded by the National Institute of Justice, was conducted by Peter
Finn, Michael Shively, Jack McDevitt, William Lassiter, and Tom Rich. See
generally CASE STUDIES, supra note 2 (outlining results of SRO study); PETER FINN,
ET AL., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS FINAL
PROJECT REPORT (2005) [hereinafter REPORT) (same); PETER FINN, ET AL.,
COMPARISON OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED AMONG 19 SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS (2005) (hereinafter COMPARISON) (same).
13. This test echoes Pinard's call for a more expansive understanding of law
enforcement "involvement" in the Fourth Amendment context. See Pinard, supra
note 7, at 1070 (suggesting that Fourth Amendment standards be employed when
law enforcement is involved in school searches, "either through their actual physical
involvement or through policies which transfer discretion from school officials to law
enforcement authorities"). As will be discussed in Part II, however, there is
considerable divergence in application of these similar notions to the discrete
doctrines.
2006]
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The attention called for here to the actual conditions of
modern schools would not result in an inflexible requirement that
all children be deemed to be in custody (and thus entitled to
Miranda warnings) by virtue of their compulsory presence at
school.' 4  Properly understood, the test set out above need not
interfere greatly with the effective administration of school safety
or discipline. A school administrator and even a school-based
police officer could question a student in most school settings
without the need to advise the student of his Miranda rights.'5
Part I of this article illustrates the ways in which courts
have mishandled the issue of Miranda in the modern school
context. Framed around a recent state court case that generated
five opinions that each failed to adequately address the issue, this
section includes a basic outline of Miranda principles and
introduces the ruling in T.L.O. Part II demonstrates that T.L.O.
cannot provide an adequate foundation for resolving the question
of students' rights during interrogation because of fundamental
differences between the Fifth Amendment and Fourth
Amendment and between interrogation and the search for
physical evidence. Part III sets forth how the Miranda
framework sensibly accommodates the attention to relationships
that is essential for resolving the challenges presented by modern
school-policing as described in the National Assessment of SRO
programs. Part IV illustrates (with a Case Study examining the
complex dynamics of student-officer relations and a separate close
analysis of a principal-officer collaboration) the ways in which the
approach developed here preserves students' rights while also
permitting effective security measures in schools, thus promoting
essential instruction in constitutional democracy
14. A plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made this mistake in its
treatment of the issue in R.H. See R.H., 791 A.2d at 333-34 (stating that it was
"uncontested that Appellant was in custody during the interrogation").
15. In fact, the rule proposed herein recognizes-contrary to many cases that cite
T.L.O.as a basis for limiting Miranda's reach-that Miranda's protections do not
extend to all cases in which school officials are in fact acting as agents of law
enforcement. Consistent with established Miranda doctrine, warnings would not be
required in any case in which the circumstances of a school official's questioning fails
to convey to the student that the official is sharing or otherwise drawing on the
authority of law enforcement officers. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 295
(1990) (noting that Miranda presumes "that the danger of coercion results from the
interrogation of custody and official interrogation").
[Vol. 52
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I. MIRANDA MEETS T.L.O. DOWN BY THE SCHOOLYARD
A. INRE R.H.: ONE STUDENT + TWO SCHOOL POLICE OFFICERS
= FIvE JUDICIAL OPINIONS
16
Investigating a report of breaking and entering and
vandalism, school police officers at East Stroudsburg High School
in Pennsylvania entered a classroom and discovered graffiti on
the blackboard, desks overturned, and a discharged fire
extinguisher. 17 Although employed by the school rather than any
municipal law enforcement agency, the school police officers were
vested with the same power to arrest as any municipal officer
(with this power confined to the territory of the school). 8 The
officers discovered a footprint in the fire extinguisher residue and
focused their attention on R.H., a student whose size was
consistent with the footprint and who had a history of behavior
problems and attended a class in the room in question. 19 One of
the school police officers, dressed in uniform and wearing a
badge, located R.H. and escorted him to the main administration
building where he had R.H. take off one of his shoes forS 20
comparison with the footprint in the residue. The officer told
R.H. that his shoe matched the print they had found, that the
officer was going to keep the shoe as evidence, and that he was
going to question R.H. about the break-in.' The officer and a
colleague questioned R.H. without advising him of his Miranda
16. R.H., 791 A.2d at 331. Courts in many states have addressed some aspect of
this issue. See, e.g., In re J.C., 591 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming trial court's ruling that no Miranda warning was required when a school
principal questioned a student in the presence of a sheriffs deputy); In re V.P., 55
S.W.3d 25, 27 (Tex.App. 2001) (affirming adjudication of delinquency after an
investigation by a police officer and an assistant principal revealed the existence of a
handgun in a student's possession); J.D. v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va.
Ct. App. 2004) (affirming a conviction arising out of incriminating non-mirandized
statements made by a student while being questioned by a principal in the presence
of a police officer); In re L.A., 21 P.3d 952, 963 (Kan. 2001) (affirming conviction
arising out of a search of a student's possessions by a principal and a school security
officer). This article uses R.H. to set out the issues because the case generated so
many differing views within one court and because the views help illuminate the
issues that need to be resolved in order to develop a constitutionally correct approach
to these questions.
17. R.H., 791 A.2d at 331.
18. Id. at 334.
19. Id. at 332.
20. Id.
21. Id.
2006]
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S22
rights, and R.H. admitted being involved in the break-in.
Charges were filed against R.H. in juvenile court and counsel
for R.H. filed a motion to suppress the incriminating statement
based on the officers' failure to advise R.H. of his Miranda rights
23before conducting a custodial interrogation. When the case
reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the State not only
conceded that no warnings were given (a necessary concession
given the evidence) but also conceded that R.H. was in custody
(an unnecessary concession apparently based on either a
misunderstanding of the law or the desire to obtain a broad
24
ruling). Instead of contesting custody, the state sought
affirmance of the lower court ruling on the ground that the school
police officers were not law enforcement officers within the
meaning of Miranda and thus, there was no basis for subjecting
the interrogation to Miranda analysis. 5 The seven justices
deciding the case produced five opinions. Before addressing these
opinions, this article will set out the pertinent elements of both
Miranda and T.L.O. so that the discordant analyses can be seen
in their proper doctrinal context.
1. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
a. Miranda Custody: A Basic Framework
i. A Degree of Restraint Similar to That Created
by anArrest
Miranda does not require police to advise suspects of their
rights regarding interrogation unless the suspect has been "taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities in any significant way .... 26 The Miranda Court
declared that the requirements it was imposing were necessary
"to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings .... 27 The individuals whose cases were before the
Court in Miranda, all of whom were questioned at a stationhouse
while being held against their will, qualified easily as having
been "taken into custody." Courts have recognized that
22. R.H., 791 A.2d at 332.
23. Id. at 333.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 333-34.
26. Id. at 478.
27. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
[Vol. 52
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individuals can be in custody in locations other than the
statonhouse28 and that merely being at a police station does not
render one in custody.29 Although the phrase "otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way" suggests a broad
conception of custody, the Court has adopted a more restrictive
view: "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest."'
ii. Suspect Focus
In Thompson v. Keohane, the Court directed judges to
contextualize the facts of the interrogation as fully and richly as
possible, making sure "the scene is set and the players' lines and
actions reconstructed. . . ."" This immersion in the facts is
essential for the court to fully appreciate, as it must, the
perspective of the suspect.32 An interrogator's intention to arrest
a suspect or to allow a suspect to leave does not affect the custody
determination unless that intention would have been manifest to
someone in the suspect's position in light of the words and deeds
of the officer and any other circumstances.33 Thus, a suspect may
be found not to be in custody, for Miranda purposes, even though
the officer concluded at the outset of the encounter that he was
going to arrest the suspect, provided that the officer's actions up
to and during the time of the questioning did not communicate
this intention. Similarly, a suspect may be found to be in
custody, notwithstanding the officer's intention to allow the
28. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969) (finding that a suspect was in
custody in his bedroom).
29. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122-23 (1983) (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) for the proposition that a suspect not under arrest
may be interviewed in a police station without being "in custody").
30. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125. The Court did create some grounds for confusion
on this point in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995), in which it directed courts
to ascertain whether a reasonable person would "have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave?" at 112. This test approximates the
test for seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and the Court had previously ruled
that the class of Fourth Amendment seizures was larger than the class of custodial
environments under Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
Whatever the Thompson Court meant to say by framing the issue this way, it
reiterated that the "ultimate inquiry" was whether the suspect had been subject to
arrest-like restraint. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112.
31. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 113.
32. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable
man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Id.
33. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 320 (1994).
2006]
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suspect to leave freely at the conclusion of the questioning,
provided the circumstances were such that a reasonable person in
the suspect's position would not have felt free to terminate the
interrogation and leave.
This focus on the suspect aligns the custody inquiry with the
definition of interrogation in Rhode Island v. Innis-express
questioning as well as "any words or actions on the part of the
police.., that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."34 The Innis
opinion explains that the definition of interrogation "focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police" precisely because Miranda's rules were
designed to protect suspects against coercive practices "without
regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. '3 5
While intended as a guide to those who would conduct
interrogations, the tests for both custody and interrogation are
designed primarily to protect the subjects of that interrogation.
Similarly, the central issue of this article-whether Miranda
applies at all to a particular class of interrogations-must also be
resolved with this degree of attention to the perceptions of the
suspect.
36
b. The ABC's of T.L.O.: What Latitude Do School
Administrators Have and When do They Have It?
The issue before the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 37 was the
constitutionality, under the Fourth Amendment, of a principal's
actions in searching a student's purse after a teacher reported
that the student broke a school rule prohibiting smoking. In the
course of the search the principal found marijuana and other
incriminating items.39 The T.L.O. Court upheld the search, but
did not give school officials the full authority the state had
34. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
35. Id.
36. The centrality of the suspect focus within Miranda doctrine is also evident
from Missouri v. Seibert, in which a plurality of the Court applied a suspect-focused
approach to a different issue within Miranda doctrine: the validity of a waiver of
rights. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Describing the plurality's approach,
Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurrence, "This test envisions an objective inquiry
from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of both intentional and
unintentional two-stage interrogations." Id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
37. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 327-28 (1985).
38. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
39. Id.
[Vol. 52
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sought.4° In a claim that foreshadowed the expansive position
taken by Pennsylvania in R.H., when it asked that school police
officers be deemed exempt from Miranda, the attorneys for New
Jersey had argued in T.L.O. that the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because students had "virtually no legitimate
expectation of privacy in articles of personal property
'unnecessarily' carried into a school."4' The Court rejected the
implicit assertion that students had no legitimate need for such
items as not "well anchored in reality."" The T.L.O. opinion
adopted a middle-ground approach, synthesizing concern for
students' liberty with an appreciation of the demands on school
administrators. The actions of school officials must comply with
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures.43  In light of administrators' "substantial
interest.., in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on
school grounds," however, the Court ruled that neither a warrant
nor probable cause was necessary for such searches to be
reasonable and thus constitutional. 4  Instead, a search need be
based only on a reasonable belief that it would turn up evidence
of a violation of a school rule.45
3. THE R.H. OPINIONS
The five opinions in R.H. fail to successfully navigate the
intersection of Miranda and T.L.O. Although they come to
different results, the plurality opinion and one dissent share the
view that the issue is quite simple. The magnitude of the errors
40. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
41. Id. at 338.
42. Id. at 339. It is now common for school districts to adopt policies, distributed
to students and parents at the start of the school year, explicitly stating that the
lockers assigned for student use while at school are school property and may be
entered at any time by school officials, thus defeating any claim of an expectation of
privacy in this space. See, e.g., Seattle Public Schools "Student Rights and
Responsibilities,Revised 8/2005, p.4, www.seattleschools.org/area/discipline/SRR200
5-06official-English.pdf, last visitied 5/4/06.
43. Id. at 333.
44. Id. at 339-42. "[T]he preservation of order and a proper educational
environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as enforcement of
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an
adult .... Accordingly, we have recognized that maintaining security and order in
the schools required a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,
and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher
relationship." Id. at 340.
45. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
20061
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within these two brief opinions, however, is evidence of the issue's
complexity. One concurrence highlights the core concern of
Miranda most clearly, but then shies away from the practical
implications of its basic insight. The remaining two opinions
engage in a rhetorical battle to claim T.L.O.'s legacy. A dissent
sees in T.L.O. a way to sidestep, or at least minimize, Miranda's
impact on the school setting, while a concurrence views T.L.O. as
a way of placing some constraints on school-based interrogation.
Each of these latter opinions is consistent with T.L.O. to some
degree, butneither is suitable as a basis for a set of rules
governing school-based interrogation.
a. Plurality Opinion
The plurality concluded that Miranda did apply to the
questioning of R.H. by the school police officers and cited as a
reason the fact that "the interrogation ultimately led to charges
by the municipal police, not punishment by school officials
pursuant to school rules."46 As one of the dissents points out, this
logic is patently erroneous. The custody determination must be
made in light of the nature of the encounter between questioner
and suspect, as experienced, not as transformed by later events.
If an officer's decision to detain a suspect does not render an
otherwise consensual encounter custodial, there is simply no
basis for according a prosecutor's subsequent charging decision
any significance in the Miranda inquiry.47
The lead opinion contains another equally significant flaw in
its acceptance (and apparent approval) of the state's concession
that all students are in custody by virtue of their status as
minors. The United States Supreme Court has recognized, in
Schall v. Martin, that children are "always in some form of
custody." 8 Like T.L.O., however, Schall did not present Fifth
Amendment concerns, and its holding and reasoning are of
limited utility in deciding the proper scope of Miranda in the
school setting. "Custody" as used in Schall is properly understood
as a form of control to which minors are subject by virtue of their
dependent status. This concept, describing a minor's inability to
make decisions and the need and obligation of another to make
them for him/her, lends nothing to an analysis of Miranda
46. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 2002).
47. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994).
48. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
[Vol. 52
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custody, which involves constraint imposed through the coercive
power of the state.
b. Dissent: When is a Police Officer Not a Police Officer?
As blithely as the plurality adopted the fallacious custody
claim, one dissent summarily dismissed the notion of requiring
school police officers to provide Miranda warnings. 49 According to
this opinion, the school police officer who interrogated R.H. "was
not a law enforcement officer for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. '50 This opinion stated that because they worked at a
school, the officers should be treated by courts in the same
manner as any other school employee.51 This assertion begs the
questions why the legislature would have conferred traditional
law enforcement powers-to arrest and detain-upon these
officers and why the District opted for a school police officer
rather than, for example, a private security guard. The opinion
makes no attempt to explain why the place where the officers do
their job-rather than what they do or how they do it-should
control the analysis. This absence renders the opinion empty.
Custody is not a function of location or of job titles. Custody, for
Miranda purposes, is a condition in which a suspect may be
placed. Ignoring the nature of the officers' authority and the
ways in which it differs from that of traditional school officials is
simply nonsensical.
The dissent's reasoning is like a riddle-when is a police
officer not a police officer? The author's linguistic contortions
around this issue are unfortunately not unique. In an even more
troubling example, a Florida appellate court affirmed a ruling
that a student was not entitled to receive Miranda warnings
when questioned in a principal's office despite the participation of
52
a sheriffs deputy in the interrogation. At the hearing on the
suppression motion, the deputy testified that he "could have
asked a question or two.'" The appellate court noted this
"complication" and stated, "[w]ithout more, this participation by
the deputy would, in our opinion, require the giving of a Miranda
49. R.H., 791 A.2d at 335 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. In re J.C., 591 So. 2d 315, 316 (1991).
53. Id. That the court would not be outraged by a deputy's testimony that he
"could have" asked a question or two, as if such details were too unimportant for him
to remember clearly, is further evidence of the court's willful blindness.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 52 Loy. L. Rev. 51 2006
Loyola Law Review [Vol. 52
warning, but the trial judge here was apparently satisfied that
the deputy's contribution was de minimus and, as the judge said,
'it doesn't strike me that the questioning was by the police
officer." 54 This example shows a court electing to be complicit in
the infantilization of the justice system as it affects the rights of
children, rather than honestly putting a true name to the law
55
enforcement practices it can only pretend not to see.
Such seemingly result-oriented opinions are not produced
only by judges who are loath to apply Miranda to school-sited
interrogation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals ordered the
suppression of statements per Miranda despite the fact that the
sheriff conducting an interrogation told the student that "he did
not have to answer the detective's questions and he was free to go
at any time.'5 6 While telling a suspect that he does not have to
answer questions, and no more, would be inadequate as an
administration of the Miranda warnings, telling a suspect that he
is free to leave, if done in a minimally plausible way, removes the
suspect from the coercive setting in which such warnings are
required. A suspect in such circumstances could neither claim
that he was seized under the broader Fourth Amendment
standard nor that he was subject to restraint equivalent to arrest.
The detective in this case was investigating an alleged sex offense
and asked the youth several times if he was acting out of curiosity
54. J.C., 591 So. 2d at 316. But cf In re G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 659 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000) (finding that principal and officer who alternated questioning were
engaged in "one concerted effort" that required warnings before any questions could
be asked by either of them).
55. The Illinois Supreme Court engaged in a similar rhetorical maneuver, albeit
in the Fourth Amendment context, in People v. Dilworth. State v. Dilworth, 661
N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996). The Court essentially ignored the testimony of the school
liaison officer in that case that he opened and searched a flashlight belonging to a
previously unsuspected student because the student and a friend were "looking,
laughing at [him] like [he] was played for a fool." Id. at 313. Unable to shoehorn this
action into the category of searches carried out or initiated by school officials, the
court invented its own classification, stating, "[t]his case is best characterized as
involving a liaison police officer conducting a search on his own initiative and
authority, in furtherance of the school's attempt to maintain a proper educational
environment." Id. at 317. That characterization is "best" only in the sense of "what
is the best face one can put on an action that is best understood as an officer
asserting his authority in the face of a mild challenge to it?" This ruling's disregard
for the lived context of the school hallways makes it far from "best" or even good as a
model for addressing law enforcement activity in schools.
56. In re Welfare of D.J.B., No. C3-02-731, 2003 WL 175546, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003).
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or the desire to rape or use force.57 The court appears to have
been troubled by this mode of questioning and the ability of the
student to resist the detective's tactics. The court offers no
satisfactory explanation, however, for its ruling that custody
existed notwithstanding the detective's introductory statements
regarding the student's freedom to leave.59  As with the other
cases discussed in this sub-section, the judge is denying words
their most obvious meaning.
c. Concurrence: The Benefits and Limits of Judicial
Modesty
One brief concurring opinion from R.H. rejects the all-or-
nothing approach of the plurality and this first dissent.6° While
seeking to preserve the latitude necessary for school
administrators to perform their jobs, this judge remarks on the
"significant change in dynamics in encounters involving school
officials dedicated to security and investigative purposes and, in
particular, uniformed school police officers, particularly where
they are possessed with the power and authority of law
enforcement officials, including the power of arrest.",6  This
sensitivity to the power relations within the interrogation
encounter is at the heart of the approach this article develops in
Parts III and IV. The opinion, however, makes no effort to draw
lines that could serve as useful guides applicable to the array of
security and law enforcement practices present in modern
schools.
d. Concurrence: A Test That Flunks
The author of the above-described brief concurrence may
well have been warned off of any attempt to provide a broadly
applicable test bV the failure of the concurring colleague who
tried to do so. This concurrence proposes a complicated
balancing test under which warnings would be required when
57. Welfare of D.J.B., 2003 WL 175546 at *1.
58. Id. at *6-7.
59. Id. at *7.
60. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 349-50 (Pa. 2002) (Saylor, J., concurring).
61. R.H., 791 A.2d at 350. The author of this opinion speaks directly to the two
dissenting judges, writing in a footnote to the section quoted here that "the
distinction between educators and those operating under color of police authority and
possessing general police powers including the power of arrest" is "highly material."
Id. at 350 n.1.
62. R.H., 791 A.2d at 348 (Newman, J., concurring).
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"the constitutional interests of the student outweigh the interest
of the school in solving the crime.6 3 Attempting to fuse Miranda
and T.L.O.-in its words, to "extend T.L.O.""64-the concurrence
creates a hybrid that does not produce the benefits of either
opinion. The opinion is reminiscent of T.L.O. in the sense that it
affirms the continued existence of a constitutional right for
students while at the same time promising greater latitude for
school officials. The test, however, is doctrinally unsound and
wholly impracticable. It mistakenly imports the reasonableness
standard of the Fourth Amendment into Fifth Amendment
doctrine 65 inviting school officials to demonstrate that,
notwithstanding the fact that a student was in custody, "it was
reasonable for them not to Mirandize the student."66  This
doctrinal transplant must be rejected. According to T.L.O., a
school official intending to search a student's person or property
need only consider her reasons for believing the student has
violated a rule.67 This is fairly concrete. The R.H. concurrence
asks that same official to consider if she has sufficient reasons for
not advising a student who would otherwise be entitled to receive
warnings. 8 This requires something quite different from an
evaluation of the quality or quantity of evidence supporting one's
actions. It requires one to make a judgment about the relative
value of competing interests. Asking those involved in
investigating possibly criminal conduct to contemplate and
compare such countervailing interests is to ask for an
unattainable degree of even-handedness.
A review of the factors to be considered as part of this
inquiry reveals that this approach also severely underemphasizes
the perspective of the suspect. The factors the opinion requires
be considered are:
(1) the age of the student to be questioned (the older the
student is, the more likely the information elicited.., will be
used against him in a court of law.. .); (2) the ability of the
juvenile to understand the Miranda warnings...; (3) the
gravity of the offense alleged (likewise, the more serious the
63. R.H., 791 A.2d at 348 (Newman, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. See infra Part II.B. (discussing Fourth Amendment principles and Miranda's
scope).
66. R.H., 791 A.2d at 348.
67. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
68. R.H., 791 A.2d at 348 (Newman, J., concurring).
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offense ... the more likely that he will be criminally
charged); (4) the prospect of criminal proceedings, as opposed
to merely school-related discipline; and (5) the extent of the
69
coercive environment in which the questioning occurs.
Factor (2) is central to the determination of whether a
suspect was capable of making a valid waiver of his rights, but it
has no place in determining whether the suspect was entitled to
these rights in the first place. Factors (1) and (3) are merely
guides to make the necessarily speculative consideration of factor
(4) more manageable. 70 They are rough surrogates, at best, for
the likelihood of prosecution, and no clear guidelines are possible.
In sum, the concurrence avoids the error of the plurality opinion,
which relied on what did happen after interrogation, by installing
a test that requires courts to go back to the moment of the
interrogation and make a prediction, as of that instant, as to
what was likely to happen. This is decidedly not an improvement.
Factor (5), the opinion notes, "presumes the existence of
custody."7' The test proposed by the concurrence thus suggests a
concept of super-custody, requiring warnings while denying
protection to student-suspects subject to merely typical custodial
restraint.
e. Dissent: Partial Credit, But Excessive Passion
A second and more detailed and impassioned dissent
cogently dissects the errors already noted in the plurality opinion
with regard to the issue of custody and the consideration of post-
interrogation events in determining whether Miranda warningsS 72
were required. This dissent articulates the appropriate test for
custody, requiring "some restriction on liberty beyond that
inherent in the school setting, and of a nature likely to affect
substantially the student's will to resist and compel him to speak
where he otherwise would not do so . ,73 In addition, the
69. R.H., 791 A.2d at 348.
70. Id. As explained in Part III.B.2. infra, it is appropriate to consider a suspect's
age in the custody inquiry, but not because of the concurrence's unsupported
assertion that a suspect's age helps determine the likelihood of prosecution. Instead,
age is important precisely because it is a necessary consideration for truly
appreciating the coercive nature of the setting.
71. R.H., 791 A.2d at 348.
72. Id. at 336-46 (Castille, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 339. See Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding a
prison inmate in custody for Miranda purposes only when subject to restriction on
liberty greater than that inherent in status as prisoner).
20061
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dissent is also persuasive in its rejection of the unworkable test
offered in the concurrence.74 Also, the dissent soundly attempts to
bring the discussion back to the crucial overarching question of
whether "the concerns that powered the Miranda decision are
present'75 in the modern schoolhouse setting.
Having cleared away much of the brush left behind by the
other opinions, however, this dissent forges errors of equal if not
greater significance. The dissenting judge states that he was
"unconvinced that appellant was in fact not free to leave" the
interrogation room. It is worth recalling that one of the two
school police officers questioning the student had taken the
student's shoe, telling him he was going to compare it with the
footprint, and then, having made the comparison, told the student
that his shoe matched the print they had and that the officer was
keeping the shoe as evidence and was going to question the
student about the break-in.77 Reason and common sense-the
values that the dissent invokes later in its opinion 78-would lead
anyone in the student's circumstances to conclude that (1) the
officer had concluded he had committed the crime 79 and (2) having
taken his shoe, the officer did not intend to allow the student to
80
walk out of the room.
Resisting the import of these fairly obvious conclusions, the
dissent notes, as if it were significant, that "the record here is
silent as to what would have happened if appellant had refused to
cooperate or attempted to leave the school building.'Al "What
would have happened," even if discernible with confidence after
the fact, is not a proper consideration in the Miranda custody
inquiry. Before pointing out this supposedly significant gap in
74. R.H., 791 A.2d at 345.
75. Id. at 337.
76. Id. at 337.
77. Id. at 332.
78. Id. at 341.
79. The officer's mere possession of information creating probable cause would not
be relevant to the custody inquiry per Stansbury, but once the officer communicates
the information to the suspect, he has changed the way the suspect will interpret the
situation, particularly with respect to his freedom to leave.
80. While it would have been physically possible for the student to leave, of
course, the notion that any student would think he would be permitted to walk away
is purely fanciful. The fact that this incident occurred in December in Pennsylvania
also undermines the dissent's implicit suggestion that the student could simply have
headed home barefoot.
81. R.H., 791 A.2d at 337. (emphasis added).
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the record, the dissent also fills in a different gap, concluding that
the student was "likely acquainted" with the school police officers
as a result of his prior disciplinary problems at the school . As
far as can be gleaned from the totality of the opinions in this case,
the student's disciplinary record indicated he had "exhibited
unruly behavior."3 There is no reference in any opinion to any
evidence in the record showing that the student's behavior prior
to the alleged break-in ever required intervention by anyone
other than a teacher. As discussed in Part III, the nature of a
student's relationship with authority figures in the school is a
proper consideration in determining the applicability of Miranda.
To be truly helpful, however, it is essential that conclusions about
the relationship rest upon solid evidence.
This imprecision as to the facts presented is indicative of the
dissent's relative lack of concern with the case before it and its
interest in a more far-reaching mission: resisting the "importation
of Miranda from the station house to the schoolhouse.', 4 It is
curious, to say the least, that the "importation" of criminal justice
principles "from the station house to the schoolhouse" appears to
raise such alarms only when those principles constrain, rather
than extend, authority-or preserve, rather than derogate,
rights.' The dissent wields the "seminal case" of T.L.O. as the
principal means of resisting this feared importation, urging that
if Miranda cannot be entirely abolished, at least its effect in
schools could be modified by "a T.L.O.-like rule of 'reason and
common sense."
8 6
There is more passion than reason in the dissent's lament,
"[wihat is a fourth-grader, for instance, to make of the Miranda
litany?"8'7 This judicial cri de coeur is notable for two reasons.
First, the case before the court involved a high school student.
Assuming, if only for a moment, that a person's incapacity to
understand and invoke legal protections was a basis for denying
the individual those protections, the proper response to that
would include, as the cumbersome concurrence did, a mechanism
82. R.H., 791 A.2d at 338. At this juncture in the opinion, the dissent refers to the
officers as "members of the school staff," an obvious rhetorical turn intended to
downplay the significance of the officer's law enforcement authority. Id.
83. Id. at 332.
84. Id. at 337.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 340.
87. R.H., 791 A.2d at 344 n.6.
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for determining the individual's capacity before extinguishing the
protection entirely. Even a minimalist approach, such as
requiring warnings in the high school setting but not in
elementary school would be a marked improvement over this
dissent's blanket exclusion of all students from Miranda's
protection. 88  This minimalist approach would itself be
constitutionally unsatisfactory precisely because justice requires
that those who are ill-equipped to assert their rights in the
criminal justice process receive greater, not lesser, protection
than those who can protect themselves. The dissent's
hypothetical fourth grader does not become any more competent
when interrogated by a police officer at the police station, yet the
child is undoubtedly entitled to all of Miranda's protections in
that setting.89 The mere invocation of overstated horrors is
simply an inadequate foundation for determining whether and
how the school setting and the responsibilities of those who work
within it require modification of basic constitutional norms, such
as those announced in Miranda.
In sum, the R.H. opinions, though numerous, prove
inadequate to resolve the question before the court. None of these
opinions, save the brief concurrence, truly focus on Miranda at
all, despite its centrality to the issue. The battle between the
R.H. dissent and concurrence over how best to apply T.L.O. to
school-based interrogation is instructive for what it reveals about
how courts are inclined to treat these issues, but, ultimately, the
energy that went into the concurrence's elaborate test and the
dissent's vehement protest is ultimately wasted. Parts II and III
of this article demonstrates how fundamental doctrinal and
practical questions render T.L.O. largely irrelevant and Miranda
especially well-suited to reconciling the disparate interests
presented by school-based interrogation, in all of its various
forms.
II. T.L.O.'S ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF
AUTHORITIES AND THOSE OF STUDENTS IS UNSUITED
TO THE INTERROGATION CONTEXT
A. T.L.O. ADDS LITTLE TO THE INTERROGATION ANALYSIS
At its most abstract level, T.L.O. remains instructive today:
88. R.H., 791 A.2d at 336-37.
89. Id. at 344 n.6.
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courts cannot determine the nature of students' rights and the
appropriate means of regulating the activities of school
authorities unless they first examine the actual circumstances of
the schools. However,T.L. O.'s most notable doctrinal innovation,
i.e., the creation of a separate standard imposing fewer
restrictions on school officials than on law enforcement officers, is
misdirected in the context of modern school-based interrogation.
Courts have consistently ruled that Miranda warnings are
unnecessary when a principal or other administrator, acting
completely independently of any law enforcement agency,
questions a student.90 In one such case, the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court held that a student's answers to a
principal's questions were admissible despite the absence of
Miranda warnings, writing:
We have no doubt, however, that the T.L.O. standards
concerning Fourth Amendment searches are equally
applicable to defendant's Fifth Amendment claim. A
school official must have leeway to question students
regarding activities that constitute either a violation of the
law or a violation of school rules. This latitude is necessary
to maintain discipline, to determine whether a student
should be excluded from the school, and to decide whether
further protection is needed for the student being
questioned or for others.91
90. In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d 1247, 1249
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that because the principal was "responsible for safety,
administration, and discipline in his school," had the "independent responsibility to
investigate a student infraction committed on school grounds," and did not act "at the
behest or direction of the police," Miranda warnings were unnecessary); In re Corey
L., 250 Cal. Rptr. 359, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that "[q]uestioning of a
student by a principal.., cannot be equated with custodial interrogation by law
enforcement officers" and thus, did not merit Miranda warnings); S.A. v. State, 654
N.E.2d 791, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that questioning by a school official and
a student's father did not constitute custody for Miranda purposes); Commonwealth
v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992) ("There is no authority requiring a
school administrator not acting on behalf of law enforcement officials to furnish
Miranda warnings."); State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580, 583- 84 (N.H. 1998) (finding
that because the school principal who searched the defendant "was neither a law
enforcement officer nor an agent of the police," no Miranda warning was needed);
State v. Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199, 203 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1995) (finding that
no Miranda warnings were required of a vice-principal who questioned defendant);
In re Harold S., 731 A.2d 265, 268 (R.I. 1999) (allowing a non-Mirandized statement
made to the principal to be admitted into evidence).
91. Biancamano, 666 A.2d at 202. (emphasis added).
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A principal acting completely independently of any law
enforcement agency, such as the one in the case quoted above,
cannot possibly convey the sort of compulsion equivalent to that
associated with arrest. Thus, there is no need for Miranda's
protections. Accordingly, straightforward Miranda analysis
would exempt such questioning from the rules applicable to
custodial interrogation. The question of custody need not even be
raised because the principal lacks the power that raises Miranda
concerns. The T.L.O. opinion-which does not address
interrogation or the Fifth Amendment privilege -simply does not
make a meaningful contribution to this straightforward Miranda
analysis. The error highlighted here, harmless in this context,
becomes consequential when judges seek to extend T.L.O.'s
"standards" to questioning conducted by or in the presence of law
enforcement officers, i.e., individuals with the power to arrest and
whose actions carry a threat of compulsion no principal acting
alone can ever convey.
The T.L.O. Court limited its ruling to "searches carried out
by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority"
explicitly withholding any opinion as to "the appropriate standard
for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials
in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies . ... 92 Although it did not cite to T.L.O. when doing so,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adapted this
approach to a Miranda inquiry in Commonwealth v. Snyder,
stating "[tihe Miranda rule does not apply to a... school
administrator who is acting neither as an instrument of the police
nor as an agent of the police pursuant to a scheme to elicit
statements from the defendant by coercion or guile." 3 Many of
the cases exempting principals from Miranda cite either to
Snyder or to a case relying on it.94 Thus, their analysis shares the
same flaw-following Illinois v. Perkins, Miranda warnings need
not be given to a suspect if he is unaware of the involvement of a
law enforcement agent in the questioning.95 Thus, a principal's
92. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985).
93. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992).
94. See supra note 98 (discussing cases in which courts allowed statements
without Miranda warnings).
95. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). For a discussion of Perkins, see Part
II.C. and III.C. It is perhaps understandable that Perkins had not come to the
attention of the Snyder Court in 1992, but for this analysis to remain undisturbed by
the time of the Tinkham opinion in 1998 is reflective of a deeply-rooted analytical
error.
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interrogation of a student could be stage-managed by a hidden
police officer without violating Miranda even in the absence of
warnings. "Guile," in and of itself, is not within Miranda's
concern. Thus, a hidden connection to law enforcement is the
same for Miranda purposes as no connection.
It is not significant that the inapplicability of T.L. O.'s Fourth
Amendment framework to school-based interrogation involving
law enforcement is most clearly shown by an example in which
following T.L.O. provides more protection for students than
Miranda requires. It is more important to note how these
mistaken cases demonstrate the necessity of applying Miranda to
modern school-based law enforcement practices. In the Fourth
Amendment context, the "agent of law enforcement" exception
recognizes that when a school administration agrees to introduce
law enforcement activity into a school, it can only do so with the
constitutional constraints imposed on law enforcement activity
generally. 9s  If a school administrator must conform to
constitutional criminal procedure norms when she agrees to a
single, ad hoc, collaboration with law enforcement with respect to
one particular incident, a fortiori, those same constitutional
principles ought to constrain school practice when the
administration undertakes a thorough-going multi-dimensional
collaboration with law enforcement This result is consistent
with the language of T.L.O., in which the court distinguished the
principal there, who acted alone, from a principal acting "in
conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies."8
The phrase "in conjunction with" is italicized here because the
typical form of collaboration in modern schools is marked by joint
action between administrators and law enforcement rather than
an agency relationship in which the schools merely do the bidding
of the police.
96. State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 640 (2001) ("The record supports the trial
court's conclusion that a prior agreement existed between the department and school
officials for purposes of establishing that an agency relationship existed.").
97. See infra Parts III-IV for a thorough discussion of this argument. See also
Heirtzler, 789 A.2d at 640. The court stated:
If school officials agree to take on the mantle of criminal investigation and
enforcement, however, they assume an understanding of constitutional criminal
law equal to that of a law enforcement officer. In such circumstances, even if
school officials claim their actions fall within the ambit of their administrative
authority, they should be charged with abiding by the constitutional protections
required in criminal investigations.
Id. See also Pinard, at 1119-1120, and Kagan, at 325.
98. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.7. (1985) (emphasis added).
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B. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES CANNOT FULLY
PROTECT THE INTERESTS SERVED BY MIRANDA
The erroneous conflation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
analysis (e.g., "we have no doubt however, that the T.L.O.
standards concerning Fourth Amendment searches are equally
applicable to defendant's Fifth Amendment claim")99 may have
escaped notice at a time when the constitutional basis of Miranda
was in doubt. With Congress,'00 many commentators,10' and the
Supreme Court 102 itself criticizing, minimizing, or belittling the
opinion, lower courts could transpose the T.L.O. framework onto
the interrogation setting and believe that they were giving
suspects at least as much constitutional protection as was due
and perhaps more. The R.H. dissent made this point explicitly,
arguing that the fact that T.L.O. reduced protection for students
under Fourth Amendment doctrine:
[Ihf anything, counsels for a greater need for a reasonable,
common sense rule in the Fifth Amendment context.
Unlike issues involving school searches or seizures,
questions involving Miranda already involve a significant
degree of attenuation from the basic right being protected,
i.e., the Fifth Amendment trial privilege against• 103
compulsory self-incrimination.
In Dickerson, however, the Supreme Court looked past its
own prior equivocation on the subject, invalidated Congress's
effort to minimize Miranda's reach, and declared Miranda to
have "announced a constitutional rule." °4 Thus, analysis of
99. Biancamano, 666 A.2d at 202 (emphasis added).
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000) (listing factors for use by trial judges for
determination of admissibility of confessions, which many commentators thought
may legislatively overrule Miranda, but which was invalidated by Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)).
101. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. 3501 and
The Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IowA L. REV. 175, 178 (1999) (arguing that section
3501 and not Miranda should govern federal cases).
102. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-446 (1974) ("we have already concluded
that the police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the
proplylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege." The Dickerson Court acknowledged "language in some of our opinions
that supports the view" that Miranda did not announce a rule of constitutional
dimension. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438.
103. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 340 (2002) (Castille, J., dissenting).
104. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
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Miranda claims cannot be so easily reduced to the quasi-
constitutional or sub-constitutional status they previously
received."05
To better understand the ways in which the Fourth
Amendment framework of T.L.O. inadequately addresses the
issues raised by interrogation, it is necessary first to consider the
variety of purposes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination serves.I In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, the
Court wrote of the privilege:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-
incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a
fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life," our distru[s]t of self-deprecatory
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to
the innocent."1 6
This multiplicity of interests has resulted in considerable
confusion as to the nature of the privilege. This article does not
attempt to delineate any irreducible essence of the privilege, but
instead draws out the contrast-as it pertains to modern school-
based law enforcement-between the protection provided by the
privilege and that rooted in the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
105. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 763 (2003) (holding that an officer's
failure to provide Miranda warnings did not violate suspect's constitutional rights
and thus did not give rise to a cause of action under title 42, section 1983 of the
United States Code); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (finding that
failure to provide Miranda warnings did not require suppression of physical evidence
found as a result of an unwarned confession).
106. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). (internal citations
omitted).
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Unlike evidence subject to search or seizure, such as illegal
drugs, a weapon, or an incriminating document, evidence sought
by interrogation is inaccessible to the state until the moment that
the suspect utters an incriminating response. The constitutional
significance of this is evident from Schmerber v. California in
which the highly invasive measure of extracting a suspect's blood
was held not to violate the Fifth Amendment because it did not
require the suspect himself to utter anything.17 In other words,
the privilege protects an interest so deeply internal that it is not
compromised even by a gross intrusion upon bodily integrity. It
is this aspect of the privilege that led the Murphy Court to speak
of the privilege as a means of respect for "the inviolability of the
human personality."1°8 To reveal self-incriminating information
by confessing is not merely to open a door behind which
something is hidden; it is to surrender oneself, literally and
figuratively.
The significance of these observations to the question of how
to regulate school-based law enforcement can be seen from a
quick hypothetical contrast. Walker Middle School is staffed with
a full-time School Resource Officer ("SRO"). Holmes Middle
School, a short distance away but in another school district, is
not. The hallways at Holmes, therefore, are monitored by
teachers and other staff. If one of the monitors at Holmes reports
to the principal that she has seen a student engage in behavior
that creates a reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, that
the student possesses illegal drugs, the principal at Holmes will
be authorized, according to T.L.O., to search that student.
Assume that the SRO at Walker observes similar behavior and
reports it to the principal at Walker. Can the principal search
the student? And what about the SRO? The resolution of those
questions turns on whether the new arrangements for policing
schools undermine the rationale for the T.L.O. rule authorizing
searches by school authorities on less than probable cause.
107. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
108. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See
also, William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J.
393 (1995). Stuntz locates the roots of the Fifth Amendment privilege in the
prosecutions of dissenters in England, and he argues that this provenance renders
the privilege ill-suited to the general run of criminal investigations. Stuntz further
notes that although "as recently as a generation ago privacy was the dominant
explanation for why the privilege existed," Stuntz, supra, at 394, "the privacy-
autonomy value that lay at the core of Miranda" has since been abandoned. Stuntz,
supra at 442-43.
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Kagan and Pinard have argued that the principal should not be
authorized to search under such circumstances."9 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals recently held that even an officer
should be permitted to search, provided the search is confined to
the scope which would be allowed for the principal.110 What is
most important about this scenario with respect to the question of
interrogation is that the search itself is not meaningfully
different when the officer conducts it than when the principal
does.
The same cannot be said with respect to interrogation of a
student. Unlike the searches in the example above, interrogation
is a psychological rather than physical process. Thus, the nature
and identity of the participants will matter. An officer's
participation in interrogation necessarily changes the experience
from the student's standpoint."' The mere presence of a law
enforcement figure at an interrogation is likely to create
apprehension and even fear. If the officer participates in the
questioning, the effects can be expected to be even greater. More
important, the effects of an officer's presence or participation are
likely to have a direct impact on the results of the process.
Simply put, the marijuana recovered from a student's backpack
will be exactly the same whether recovered by an officer or a
principal, and it is no more likely to be discovered if the officer is
involved. A suspect's statement, on the other hand, is the
intangible product of an interaction between the people involved.
The content of any such statement is shaped by the personalities•• • 112
and actions of all participants. The statements a student
109. See Kagan, supra note 6, at 294, 325 (describing students as "children without
rights" who are searched and then subjected to "severely-punitive, adult-like
consequences under the TL.O. reasoning); Pinard, supra note 7, at 1070 (stating that
"the current standards which govern the Fourth Amendment's application in public
school searches need to be revamped in light of the increased interdependency
between school officials and law enforcement authorities in the years following
[T.L.0.]").
110. In re S.W., 614 S.E.2d 424, 426 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (extending analysis
applied to searches by school officials to law enforcement officers working "in
conjunction with school officials"). See also Stuntz, supra note 114, at 445 (reasoning
that "one's privacy interest does not depend on whether one is being searched by a
police officer or a school principal").
111. This insight was at the heart of the abbreviated concurrence in R.H.,
discussed supra Part I. In re R.H. 791 A.2d 331 (2002) (Newman, concurring).
112. In a November 30, 2005 presentation at Seattle University School of Law,
Professor Richard Leo (Criminology, Law and Society, University of California-
Irvine) described a confession as "a co-authored product."
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makes in response to questioning may vary considerably
depending upon his or her reaction to and apprehension of the
people involved in the questioning. In fact, whether the student
speaks at all may depend in large part on such reactions and
apprehensions.
These distinctions between searching for evidence and
conducting an interrogation are mirrored in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. The T.L.O. Court was able to undertake the
balancing of interests because the text of the Fourth Amendment
makes reasonableness a central consideration and thus invites
such balancing. 113 The recognition of "special needs" within the
school setting weighed in favor of expanded, but not unlimited,
discretion for administrators.14  Individual rights had to yield
accordingly, permitting searches upon a lesser showing ofS 115
suspicion than would otherwise be required. In contrast, "[tihe
Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's, are not
removed by showing reasonableness." 116 Authorities may not
obtain judicial authorization to compel a confession, no matter
what the quality or quantity of evidence supporting their action,
unless they offer immunity and thereby remove the possibility of
incrimination. The Fifth Amendment's protections for the
individual do not offer courts the opportunity for balancing, but
instead require courts to scrutinize the circumstances in which
the individual is placed for sufficient indicia of compulsion and
then, if the compulsion comes from the custodial setting of an
interrogation, to determine if the questioner complied with
Miranda's requirements."'
C. DETERMINING MIRANDA'S PROPER SCOPE REQUIRES
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG ALL PARTIES TO
SCHOOL-BASED INTERROGATION
The Miranda Court recognized that, even in the absence of
physical coercion, 1a police officer's dominance of the custodial
113. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
114. Id. at 351.
115. Id. at 365.
116. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976).
117. The "public safety" exception to Miranda, announced in New York v. Quarles is
one significant exception to this rule. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56
(1984).
118. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) ("Since [Chambers v. Florida]
this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical and that
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interrogation setting created grave risks to a suspect's ability to
make and persist in a decision to refuse to answer questions. The
Court highlighted the fact that contemporary interrogation
manuals instructed officers to create and exploit conditions in
which the suspect would be deprived of the support that would
encourage or enable the suspect to resist the officer's authority.
12 °
In the absence of such support, the suspect would lack confidence
"in himself or his surroundings."2' As a result, the will of the
suspect would collapse and be supplanted by the will of the• • • 122
interrogator. The protections announced in Miranda were
designed to re-balance what would otherwise be a relationship of
dominance.
Since Miranda, the Court has explicitly made the
relationships among suspects, questioners, and important third-
parties a crucial factor in determining the scope of Miranda's
protections. Two such cases involved probation officers,
individuals whose ambiguous status makes them an extremely
useful comparison group in the discussion of school-based police.
In Fare v. Michael C., the Court rejected a claim that a juvenile
suspect's request to have his probation officer present was
123
equivalent to the assertion of the right to counsel.. In Minnesota
v. Murphy, the Court ruled that statements made by an adult
probationer in a mandatory interview with his probation officer
need not be suppressed despite the absence of Miranda warnings
even though the probation officer had inquired about crimes other
than that for which the individual was on probation and had done
so with the intention of reporting incriminating answers to law
the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."
(quoting Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
119. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451 (citing one interrogation manual which taught
would-be interrogators that a successful interrogator "must dominate his subject and
overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain the truth").
120. Id. at 450. The Court highlighted the contrast one manual drew between a
home and a police station. At home, the suspect's "family and other friends are
nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his office, the investigator
possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces
of the law." Id. Later, the Court crystallized the approach against which it designed
its protections as follows: "To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent
distraction and to deprive him of any outside support." Id. at 455.
121. This insecurity is created by keeping the suspect "off balance." Id. at 455.
122. See id. at 457 ("It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created
for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.").
123. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 722 (1979).
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enforcement.124
These cases share more than their negative results for the
suspects. In each case, the Court explained its ruling in ways
that relate back to the concern about a relationship of dominance
that was at the heart of Miranda. One of the ways the Miranda
Court chose to accomplish the necessary re-balancing between
suspect and interrogator was by granting the suspect the right to
the presence of counsel, a person sworn to undivided loyalty to
the suspect. 125 The Fare Court ruled that a probation officer could
not fulfill this function because a probation officer is:
[A] peace officer, and as such is allied, to a greater or lesser
extent, with his fellow peace officers. [The probation officer]
owes an obligation to the State .... In most cases, the
probation officer is duty bound to report wrongdoing by the
juvenile when it comes to [the officer's] attention, even if by
communication from the juvenile himself. Precisely because
the probation officer's loyalty runs in twoopposite
directions-to the youth and to the law enforcement
authorities-she is unable to achieve the rebalancing that
Miranda seeks. In Murphy, the Court asserted that
Murphy's prior dealings with his probation officer ought to
have "served to familiarize him with her and her office and to
insulate him from psychological intimidation that might
overbear his desire to claim the privilege."27 Just as the Fare
probation officer could not sufficiently re-balance the
interrogation setting, the Murphy probation officer was seen
as insufficiently authoritative to unbalance a suspect and
render him incapable of refusing to answer questions.
The Murphy Court did observe that "[a] different question
would be presented if [the suspect] had been interviewed by his
124. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
125. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (noting that "circumstances surrounding in-custody
interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware
of his privilege by his interrogators" which makes the right to counsel at the
interrogation "indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege").
See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (holding that a suspect who
asserts right to counsel cannot be interrogated unless he is first given the
opportunity to consult with counsel or the suspect initiates contact with the
authorities).
126. Fare, 442 U.S. at 720.
127. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433.
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probation officer while being held in police custody."128 The Court
has never addressed that specific question, but it did resolve a
similar issue in Arizona v. Mauro, where the suspect was in
police custody related to the killing of his son. The police granted
Mauro's wife's request to speak with Mauro, and then heard
incriminating statements he made to her. The Mauro Court
ruled that Miranda did not prohibit the admission of statements
Mauro made in the course of the conversation with his wife, who
was herself a suspect at the time of their conversation. The Court
reasoned that, even though Mauro was indisputably in custody,
questioning by his wife, someone he knew was not a law
enforcement officer, did not amount to interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda.
In Mauro, the nature of the relationship between questioner
(wife) and suspect (husband) trumped the plain language of the
controlling test for interrogation: "any words or actions on the
part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."3 ° The
Mauro majority strained to harmonize its ruling with the Innis
test. The police did not question Mauro, but they did permit his
wife to enter the room to speak with Mauro while an officer
remained inside the room. Given the complete control the police
had over Mauro's contact with other people while he remained in
custody, his encounter with his wife was undeniably the result of
action on the part of the police.' With respect to the second half
of the Innis test, the majority ultimately determined that,
although incrimination was at least minimally foreseeable, the
facts did "not present a sufficient likelihood of incrimination" to
require a finding of interrogation under Innis.l11 The Court made
no effort to "show its math" with respect to this calculation of the
probability of incrimination, and it is hard to see how one could
conclude that incrimination was anything but the most likely
outcome of such a conversation.
133
128. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 n.5.
129. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
130. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
131. This situation is clearly distinguishable from one where a suspect is placed
under arrest and while the police are arranging for his transport a family member
approaches and engages the suspect in conversation. The inability of the police to
control that inadvertent encounter would render it unjustifiable to consider the
ensuing statement by the suspect as a result of police action.
132. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529 n.6.
133. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7 (4th ed. 2000)
2006]
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Notwithstanding the foregoing criticism, the Mauro result is
consistent with the core values of Miranda. However tortuously
it applied the Innis test, the Mauro majority persuasively asserts
that the "weakness" of Mauro's claim of having been interrogated
can be "underscored by examining the situation from his
perspective,"'34 the very thing that Innis requires courts to do.
35
The Mauro majority raises a well-placed "doubt that a suspect,
told by officers that his wife will be allowed to speak to him,
would feel that he was being coerced to incriminate himself in
any way."136 There is nothing in the case to suggest that it would
have been reasonable for Mauro to conclude that his wife was
being used as a tool by those with the ability to extend his
custodial status or otherwise inflict harm on him if he chose not
to speak to her. Thus, rather than placing excessive strain on the
Innis formulation, the Mauro majority ought to have placed the
case outside Miranda's reach on relational grounds. The
independence of the wife from law enforcement placed Mauro on
level ground during their conversation, thus rendering untoward
coercion unlikely and warnings unnecessary despite Mauro's
custodial status. Mauro has been cited in a number of third-
party questioning cases in which a reasonable person in the
suspect's circumstances would have experienced the encounter as
an incident within an ongoing relationship she had with the
third-party and not as part of a joint undertaking between the
third-party and law enforcement. 3 7 In such cases, the suspect's
(discussing the effects of such conversations in an interrogation context).
134. Mauro, 481 U.S at 528.
135. See supra Part I. for a discussion of Innis.
136. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 528.
137. See generally Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the defendant's incriminatory statements to his friends were admissible although he
asked for a lawyer); Snethen v. Nix, 885 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
police had coerced the defendant into making inculpatory statements when they had
his mother urge him to confess); Cook v. State, 514 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1999) (holding
that the defendant's inculpatory statements to his father were admissible because
his father, through an FBI agent, was acting in his familial capacity when the
statements were made); United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that defendant's aunt was not acting in her capacity as a police officer when
she urged the defendant to confess). In most such cases, the non-police actor is a
close relative or intimate acquaintance of the suspect, with no pre-existing
relationship with the police (except for Gaddy and Cook where relatives who spoke
with the suspects were professionally affiliated with police, although not engaged in
official business when meeting with suspect). The primacy of the suspect-questioner
relationship in the suspect's eyes is best exemplified by Cook, in which the suspect
asked to speak with his father at the same time that he asked for a lawyer. Cook,
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responses are best seen as deriving from their relationship to the
questioner rather than from the questioner's relationship to the
police.
Mauro could be easily subsumed under Illinois v. Perkins, in
which the Court held that statements made by an inmate to an
undercover police officer posing as a fellow inmate did not need to
be suppressed notwithstanding the absence of Miranda
warnings. 13 The Court assumed, for purposes of discussion, that
Perkins was in custody within the meaning of Miranda, and there
was no doubt that he was interrogated in that he was asked• • • • 139
direct questions about the offense under investigation. Thus, a
formalistic application of Miranda would have resulted in
suppression. The Perkins Court, however, recognized that,
viewed from the perspective of the suspect, the dangers that
Miranda sought to prevent were not present. 14 Perkins had no
reason to believe that the person he was speaking with exercised
any official authority over him or could use officially-sanctioned
force to compel him to speak against his wishes.' In other
words, his relationship with his interlocutor was not unbalanced
in any way that Miranda warnings or the presence of counsel
were necessary to correct. Although their significance for day-to-
day criminal investigations has been largely eclipsed by Perkins,
the Mauro cases remain instructive for the examination of
schoolhouse questioning precisely because the often-jumbled
relationships characteristic of modern school-based law
enforcement do not lend themselves to simple resolution per
Perkins.
The foregoing analysis of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
doctrines establishes that it is unwise to address school-based
interrogation through the Fourth Amendment lens of T.L.O. and
far preferable to look instead to Miranda to resolve the
514 S.E.2d at 662. These actions suggest that he viewed the lawyer as a necessary
buffer in his interactions with the police, but that he needed no such buffer with
regard to his father. Id.
138. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 295 (1990) ("Conversations between suspects
and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The
essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere' and compulsion are not
present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to
be a fellow inmate.").
139. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 295.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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complicated questions presented by such practices. Part III
presents a framework for doing so that is tailored to the realities
of modern school life, and Part IV applies that framework to
examples of interrogation drawn from circumstances that have
become common in schools today.
III. MINOR MODIFICATIONS TO MIRANDA DOCTRINE
WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS THE SPECIAL
CHALLENGES POSED BY MODERN SCHOOL-BASED
INTERROGATION
The discussion in Part II.C of the significance of the
relationships among suspects, questioners, and other actors
provides a foundation for resolving whether and how the Miranda
framework should apply to school-based interrogation. It bears
pointing out that the determination that Miranda applies in a
given situation does not amount to a ruling that warnings are
required. Instead, such a determination is merely the prelude to
the standard Miranda inquiry with respect to custody and
interrogation. In deciding whether Miranda applies to any
particular instance of school-based questioning, a court must ask
whether it would be reasonable for a person in the circumstances
of the student-suspect to believe that she was the subject of law
enforcement activity.' Rather than stopping at the superficially
attractive inquiry "who asked the question(s)?," a court should
conduct an analysis of the relationships among all parties
involved. Courts should examine how a reasonable student would
understand his or her experience, considering the role, if any,
that a law enforcement officer plays in the specific encounter as
well as the background norms within the school as to how
authority is asserted in such situations. Where the totality of the
circumstances reflect the influence of law enforcement authority,
further Miranda analysis is necessary.
This approach expands upon, but is consistent with, the
command of Miranda to provide guidance to law enforcement as
142. This formulation is similar to that set out by the Washington Supreme Court
in State v. Heritage, 95 P.3d 345, 347-350 (Wash. 2004). In that case, however, the
court focused on the suspect's perception of the identity of the questioner and the test
offered here examines instead the suspect's understanding of the power to which she
is vulnerable. This modification is necessary in order to capture the possibilities for
coercion created due to school-law enforcement collaborations in which the
boundaries between the authority and responsibilities of school and law enforcement
actors are quite fluid.
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to how the power conferred upon them may be used in the
interrogation of suspects. In fact, this expansion is congruent
with the obligation of school authorities to adapt their practices to
criminal procedure norms when they engage in collaboration with
law enforcement. Just as schools that "import" law enforcement
practices into their domain assume an obligation to respect the
constraints attendant upon such practices, so does a law
enforcement agency that exports its authority into the school
setting retain an obligation to continue to honor appropriate
constraints with respect to how that authority is deployed and
leveraged. Just as schools cannot pretend ignorance of the rules
of criminal procedure, neither can police ignore, as beyond their
responsibility, the ways in which school officials take advantage
of their presence and actions.
Regulating school-based interrogation need not unduly
hinder school-based policing. Applying basic Miranda principles
will leave school and law enforcement officials with considerable
latitude in how they operate generally and even with respect to
how they conduct interrogations of student suspects. Thus, the
protection of students' rights need not come at the cost of
predictability for authorities or effective school security.
Applying Miranda's rules to school-sited interrogation will not
mean that administrators and school-based law enforcement
officers will have to advise students of their rights before every
conversation or inquiry. There are simple means, regularly
employed by law enforcement in other settings and easily adapted
by administrators, to enable school-sited authorities to pursue
desired information without creating barriers to disclosure or
compromising students' rights. The recognition that some school
settings and law enforcement practices do create genuine risks of
coercion, however, means that neither officers nor the school
officials with whom they collaborate can assume that Miranda is
inapplicable merely because the officials, rather than the officers,
question students.
A. POLICE PERFORM A WIDE RANGE OF ROLES
IN SCHOOLS TODAY
T.L.O. illustrates the common sense principle that in order
143. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (granting certiorari "in order
further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege
against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow").
2006]
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to determine the scope of students' constitutional rights, courts
must engage in an accurate examination of the actual conditions
in the schools.'" As noted earlier, the T.L.O. Court rejected
arguments in favor of broader latitude for administrators because
they were "in tension with contemporary reality" or not "well
anchored in reality."145 Thus, before setting forth how Miranda
should apply to modern school-based interrogation, it is necessary
to provide some detail about current school-based policing
practices.
The National Association of School Resource Officers has
recently claimed that school-based policing is "the fastest growing
area of law enforcement."46 A school resource officer ("SRO") is a
"certified law enforcement officer who is permanently assigned
to ... a school or a set of schools."' 7 As of Fall 2004, the federal
government's COPS in Schools program had provided $748
million to more than 3,000 law enforcement agencies which used
that money to hire more than 6,500 school resource officers.
14 8
Proponents of school-based policing frequently describe a school
resource officer's job by using the "TRIAD" model. 4 9 This model
assigns the SRO three roles: teacher, counselor, and law
enforcement agent. 150 Neither the TRIAD model nor even the
144. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 366 (1985).
145. Id.
146. National Association of School Resource Officers, NASRO Homepage,
http://www.nasro.org/about-nasro.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). Both Pinard and
Kagan provide similar descriptions of the development of school-based policing. See
Pinard, supra note 8, at 1075 (discussing the increased presence of law enforcement
in public schools); Kagan, supra note 8, at 306 (discussing increases in government
funding for school police officers).
147. The Center for the Prevention of School Violence, httpj/www.ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/
sro.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006) (defining the term SRO and providing
informational links about SROs).
148. COPS Fact Sheet, September 2004. http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf
?Item=315 (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). To qualify for federal financial support, a law
enforcement agency must commit to having the SRO spend 75% of his or her time to
work in and around primary and secondary schools. Id.
149. See COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 2 ("Most of the 19 programs included in
the National Assessment reflect this model, but the level of emphasis that SROs
devote to each of the three roles varies considerably across and within programs.").
150. See Concord, New Hampshire Police Department Website, http://www.ci.conco
rd.nh.us/Police/concordv2.asp?siteindx=P20,05,01,09 (last visited Apr. 18, 2006)
(explaining each of the roles of an SRO and their significance in New Hampshire
public schools); Wichita, Kansas Official Website, http://www.wichita.gov/CityOffices
/Police/Schools/SRO/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2006) (listing the identity of the local
Wichita SROs and explaining their role in the community). The Center for the
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SRO approach is the exclusive method of school-based policing.
In a number of school systems, especially in large urban districts,
responsibility for security and law enforcement is in the hands of
a special-purpose police force, i.e., a municipal entity staffed by
sworn police officers with responsibility solely for school
properties and activities.1
5
'
The approach advocated in this article is intended to cover
school policing in all of its forms. Because of the way it attempts
to blend the law enforcement role with other responsibilities and
because that blending presents special challenges for Miranda
analysis, the SRO model will receive more extended attention in
the subsequent analysis than other approaches. The recent
release of the National Assessment of SRO programs reports
funded by the National Institute of Justice makes it possible to
move beyond the assumptions and theories of the proponents of
school-based policing and to address data about how SROs
interact with students and administrators. The authors of the
National Assessment describe the existence of a wide range with
respect to the nature and balance of SROs' activities. "There is
considerable variation in the proportion of time the SROs in the
19 sites included in this study devote to each of the three roles."
15 2
Prevention of School Violence describes these responsibilities even more precisely as
"law enforcement officer, law-related counselor, and law-related education teacher"
but also notes that SROs "first and foremost are law enforcement officers." The
Center For Prevention of School Violence, http//www.ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/sro/promstra
tsro.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). See also COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 2
(stating that specificity, clarity and the narrowing of officers' leeway in carrying out
their roles are "key steps to success" for an SRO program).
151. See, e.g., Los Angeles School Police Department Website, http://www.laspd.co
m/home.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006) ("The Los Angeles School Police Department
(LASPD) was established in August of 1948 to create a safe and tranquil
environment for the students, teachers and staff of the Los Angeles Unified School
District."). Los Angeles School Police Department is the fifth largest police
department in Los Angeles County. Id. See also Chicago Public Schools, Press
Release, New Safety Enhancements Slated for Chicago Public Schools,
http://www.cps.kl2.il.us/AboutCPS/PressReleases/September 2004/Safety-Enhance
ments (last visited June 7, 2005) (on file with Loyola Law Review) (noting that the
City of Chicago assigns two officers from the Chicago Police Department to most high
schools). Stefkovich and Miller call attention to another important feature of the
modern school environment, the deployment of professional security staff who are
not stationed in schools in an official law enforcement capacity, but who operate in a
manner much like police officers whether "because of past professional experiences
as law enforcement officers, current responsibilities that include assisting with
school discipline, safety and law enforcement issues or personal/professional
relationships with the police." Stefkovich & Miller, supra note 9, at 66.
152. COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 15.
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SROs in one observed district spent only approximately 10% of
their time engaged in law enforcement with 40% spent
teaching. 5 3 Two SROs in the study spent "nearly 100% of their
time doing law enforcement."'5 Many other SROs fell in between
these extremes. One SRO broke up only two fights in one school
year and made no arrests. In another district, "SROs make more
arrests per officer than do regular patrol officers."' 5
In several instances identified in the Assessment, the
allocation of SRO time and energy is clearly the result of policy
decisions made in advance, decisions that reflect and reinforce a
culture within a school environment that must be considered
when deciding whether Miranda applies. One district, where the
SROs rarely act in a law enforcement capacity, has a low crime
rate, as does the community of which the school is a part. The
Juvenile Court discourages the referral of minor cases from the
schools. 5 6 "From the outset, the school district has considered
teaching and mentoring equally if not more important than the
SROs' law enforcement responsibilities. 57  The successful
implementation of this model was corroborated by the views of
students and teachers. "The SRO's office... is crowded between
classes and during all four 20-minute lunch periods with students
who want to chat."5 " Teachers make requests for the SRO to
appear in class, as guest teacher, and view the SRO "like another
staff person."5 9 In another school, by contrast, the administration
attempted to confine the SRO to primarily law enforcement
activities, based on the principal's belief that "[bly high school,
kids see the officers as law enforcers and expect them to act as
such.' 6°
In other schools, the evidence reflects less forethought before
implementing such programs and ineffective communication
during their operation. These deficits leave the lines of authority
153. CASE STUDIES, supra note 2, at 10.
154. COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 15.
155. CASE STUDIES, supra note 2, at 140.
156. REPORT, supra note 12, at 22.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also Andrea G. Bough, Note, Searches and Seizures in Schools: Should
Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause Apply to School Resource/Liaison Officers?,
67 UMKC L. REV. 543, 561 (1999) (listing examples of reference to SROs as members
of school staff).
160. COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 20.
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within a school unclear. "Two administrators used their SROs as
substitute building administrators, leaving them in charge when
the administrators left the building."161  Not only would it be
understandable for students to view the officers and the
administrators as interchangeable, it would be disingenuous for
officers, administrators, or judges to treat such confusion on the
students' part as anything but the predictable result of this
particular school-law enforcement collaboration. The Assessment
reveals that when such collaboration is sloppily run, the potential
for confusion affects all parties. One SRO observed that "[tihe
biggest problem was-and still is-that school officials want
[School Resource Officers] to be security, but ... [the officers'
purpose] is education and getting kids to see cops as friends
rather than enemies-it's not security only.""2 This comment not
only highlights the potential for confusion; it makes clear that the
dynamics of officer-student relations are central to the school-
policing undertaking and, as such, must be central to the
regulation of school-based interrogation.
The glimpse inside modern schools offered by the SRO
Assessment shows how absurd it is to speak about what "School
Resource Officers" or "school administrators" do as if a job title
speaks for itself and means the same thing in all schools at all
times. Lawyers for a student from the school noted above with
the low crime rate and the SRO who teaches more than she
patrols would have difficulty establishing a background of
coercion or fear, especially if the prosecution elicited the evidence
of the culture and operation of the SRO program there and
161. COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 30. This example supports Pinard's conclusion
that "the relational dynamics between law enforcement authorities and school
officials have shifted to such an extent that it is no longer possible to distinguish
between the law enforcement and public school contexts." Pinard, supra note 7, at
1096. The role and authority of the liaison officer in the Dilworth case was equally
ill-defined, comprised of both law enforcement and routine disciplinary authority.
State v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 312-13 (Ill. 1996) (The court defines the law
enforcement liaison's "primary purpose at the school" as "prevent[ing] criminal
activity" and notes the liaison had authority to "arrest the offender and transport the
offender to the police station. [The liaison] also handled some disciplinary problems.
Like the teachers, [the liaison] was authorized to give a detention, but not a
suspension."). In another school, which employed both an SRO trained in the TRIAD
approach and a security guard with no such training, the principal was observed
referring many students to the security guard for mentoring, apparently because the
principal believed that, as a woman, she was naturally better-suited for this role.
COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 112.
162. COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 70.
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showed that the officer's behavior in the incident in question was
consistent with that scheme. A student from a school where the
officers are seen and deployed as law enforcers would be much
more persuasive in claiming to have viewed an encounter with an
SRO as coercive and arrest-like. Students from the school with
the ad hoc lines of authority described in the preceding paragraph
could certainly be forgiven for not knowing what to expect when
questioned sharply by the SRO, who might at that moment also
be the acting principal, and even, perhaps, by the principal who
apparently saw herself as interchangeable with the SRO. The
diversity of arrangements described within the Assessment
undermines any approach to interrogation issues that proceeds
from an invariant notion of a school. T.L.O.'s categorical
approach eschews this vital contextual, school-based and
incident-based consideration of the facts, while Miranda doctrine
has always required it.
B. INTERROGATION RULES MUST BE ADAPTED IN LIGHT OF
THE ROLES LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ACTUALLY
PLAY IN SCHOOLS
1. MIRANDA APPLIES TO THE ACTIONS OF ALL SWORN POLICE
OFFICERS OPERATING AT SCHOOL
Courts should not hesitate long before concluding that
Miranda applies to the members of an external police force or a
school-based police force operating within the traditional law
enforcement paradigm. As discussed in Part I, this is not because
all students are necessarily in custody while in school. The
question of Miranda's application precedes that of custody and
turns not on the suspect's status but on the nature of the
questioner's authority. Police officers are not divested of their
law enforcement authority when they enter schools; schools
employ them precisely because they wield this authority. The
TRIAD model of school-based policing does present the question
more subtly. The National Assessment provides examples of
SROs who function as well-integrated members of an educational
team, teaching classes, counseling students and promoting a
constructive educational environment. These practices will likely
have a significant impact on the ultimate determination of
custody in any particular case, but they should not result in a
negative answer to the threshold question of whether Miranda
applies at all. Even more unmistakably than the probation
officers in Fare and Murphy, the SRO is "a peace officer." The
[Vol. 52
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SRO is not merely "allied with other peace officers" and obligated
to report student wrongdoing; the SRO is authorized and even
obligated to make arrests for such conduct. Thus, under the test
set out above, it would be reasonable for a student questioned by
an SRO about suspected criminal conduct to believe that she was
the subject of law enforcement activity. It would be quite
unreasonable to require students to ignore the words on the
badge and uniform that SROs wear-to assume that a student
under suspicion would ever forget what the "0" in "SRO" stands
for.
The nature of the policing culture at a given school will likely
be influential in the determination as to whether a specific
encounter between a student and an SRO was custodial or not.
In a school where the law enforcement leg of the TRIAD triangle
is relatively short and the SRO's efforts are largely devoted to
education, counseling, and relationship building, the tenor of
most student-SRO interactions will likely reflect this norm.
Likewise, in a school where officers are tasked primarily to
perform law enforcement functions, student-SRO meetings will be
more likely to appear coercive rather than consensual. Of course,
it is crucial that neither the officers who question a student nor
the judge who later evaluates that questioning assume that every
encounter fits the school's norm. Instead, evidence of the norm
provides a useful background for evaluating the specific
encounter in question and an important part of the reconstruction
of the scene that the Supreme Court called for in Thompson v.
Keohane.6 3  The various factors traditionally considered in
custody determinations,'6 as well as those peculiar to the school
setting, must be overlaid upon this background in order to be
properly understood.
163. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 99 (1999) ("[Tlhe crucial question entails
an evaluation made after determination of those circumstances: if encountered by a
'reasonable person,' would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined
in Miranda?").
164. See, e.g., United States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 710 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
that the "ultimate inquiry concerning custody is whether there was a ... restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest"); Sprosty v.
Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1996) (employing a totality of circumstances test
to determine custody).
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2. ATTENTION TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELATIONSHIPS
WITHIN THE SCHOOL SETTING REQUIRES SOME
MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING MIRANDA DOCTRINE
The custody determination has always been highly fact-
specific, so it requires no structural change in doctrine for courts
to accord due significance to school policing culture when
determining custody. Two features of the school setting-the
nature of the student's relationship with the school law
enforcement officer, and the age of the student-require
substantial modifications to existing law. The failure to make
such modifications would result in a doctrine that lacks a solid
foundation in the reality of the modern schoolhouse.
a. The Nature of the Relationships between a Student and
the Law Enforcement Officers Deployed at a School is a
Critical Factor in Custody Determinations
In Yarbrough v. Alvarado, the Supreme Court squarely
rejected a claim that in determining whether a suspect was in
custody at the time of questioning, a court should consider thet • 165
suspect's prior experience with law enforcement. Explaining
this holding, Justice Kennedy wrote:
"In most cases, police officers will not know a suspect's
interrogation history. Even if they do, the relationship
between a suspect's past experiences and the likelihood a
reasonable person would feel free to leave often will be
speculative .... We do not ask police officers to consider
these contingent psychological factors when deciding when
suspects should be advised of their Miranda rights. The
inquiry turns too much on the suspect's subjective state of
mind and not enough on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation.
166
Although Justice Kennedy did not cite any empirical support
165. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668-69 (2004). As discussed in Part
III.B.2.b infra, the Court treated this issue quite differently from the other claim
before it, that the trial court should have considered the age of the suspect in making
its custody determination. The Court rejected that claim, but did so "under the
deferential standard" of the habeas statute, which requires that trial court rulings be
upheld unless they contradict clearly established law. Id. at 668. The Court rejected
the claim regarding prior experience "as a de novo matter." Id.
166. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323
(1994)).
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for the assertion that interrogating officers are unlikely to be
aware of a suspect's interrogation history, it seems plausible with
respect to spontaneous interrogations of a suspect previously
unknown to the officers personally and not under active
investigation for long. Such ignorance, however, is far less likely
in circumstances such as those presented in Alvarado, where the
encounter with Alvarado was arranged in advance. Having
identified Alvarado as a potential suspect, or even merely a
witness, in a month-old murder investigation, the detective would
have been careless, if not outright incompetent, not to check
Alvarado's background to determine the extent and nature of any
prior contacts with law enforcement, including whether he had
ever been interrogated before. Neglecting such information, the
detective would be forsaking potentially effective weapons in the
interrogation setting. Knowing the suspect's history would be
essential to identifying his likely approach to the encounter and
perhaps also some areas of vulnerability. Justice Kennedy's
second listed concern-the difficulty an officer would face in
making sense of a suspect's history with law enforcement-is far
better founded, and, thus, in many situations, the Alvarado rule
may make sense.
The nature of a school police officer's assignment renders
both of these concerns inapplicable to the school setting. A school
police officer's assignment to a school is quite unlike most police
deployments. The school (or even set of schools) to which an
officer is assigned is a closed universe. Not only are the same
people there every day, but, access by others is tightly controlled.
By contrast, even a community policing officer who develops
familiarity with the stable and regular inhabitants of her
assigned area must contend with the fact that individuals from
outside the neighborhood may come through at any time. Schools
are not accessible to the wider world in this way. The school
police officer has the ability to interact with and comprehend the
totality of the school community in ways that cannot be replicated
in most other settings. The TRIAD model of school resource
policing directs SROs to develop relationships with the school
population-students, teachers, and administrators -as much as
possible.
These aspects of the school police officer's assignment make
it necessary to qualify the Alvarado ruling and require courts to
consider pertinent relationships between students and school
police officers. The assumptions Justice Kennedy made in
2006]
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Alvarado are inapplicable to the schoolhouse context. Any school
police officer is likely to be aware of a particular student's history
with school-based law enforcement, as embodied by herself or any
other officer. 6 7 Acknowledging the shared history between officer
and student is consistent with the Murphy Court's consideration
of familiarity in deciding that Miranda ought not to apply to
meetings between a suspect and a probation officer. Some of the
implications of this argument are worked out through the
hypotheticals in Part IV.A. They are represented graphically in
Figures 1, la, and lb. Figure 1 presents a field upon which one
can map the history between a particular student and the SRO's
at school. Other things being equal, the more coercive the prior
interactions have been, the more constrained the student is likely
to feel during the instant encounter. The maximally cooperative
history places the officer alongside the student in a posture
consistent with a more consensual and, from the student's
perspective, a less constraining encounter (Figure la). The
maximally coercive history places the officer figuratively on top of
the student, in a dominant position (Figure 1b).
167. This consideration of the student's history with law enforcement must be
limited to the history with the school's SROs. It does not invite consideration of the
student's involvement with law enforcement outside of the school context in which
the interrogation is taking place.
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b. A Student-Suspect's Age is an Essential Consideration
in the Determination of Custody in School-Based
Interrogations
The youth of a student suspect is one of the most salient
features distinguishing schoolhouse interrogations from general
law enforcement questioning. In Alvarado, however, the Court
sent an uncertain signal regarding the significance of youth as a
factor in the custody inquiry. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, declared that a lower court's failure to consider the
suspect's age was not an unreasonable application of clearly
established law and affirmed the denial of the habeas petition
there at issue.16" This was a more measured approach than the
Court took with respect to the consideration of the suspect's
experience with law enforcement discussed in the preceding
section. The Court declared the consideration of that factor to be
wrong "as a de novo matter."169 This invites the conclusion that,
faced with the issue on direct appeal, the Court might decide that
a suspect's age, unlike his experience with law enforcement,
might be an appropriate consideration within the custody inquiry.
Justice O'Connor, a member of the five-vote majority, wrote in a
concurring opinion that "[tihere may be cases in which a suspect's
age will be relevant to the Miranda custody inquiry."'7° Justice
O'Connor asserted that because Alvarado was nearly eighteen at
the time he was questioned, he could be expected to behave more
like an adult than like a younger suspect. Justice Breyer
dissented to the age ruling on the grounds that ignoring such a
patent characteristic as age would overly objectify the "reasonable
person" standard and "would produce absurd results."7' In light
of the treatment of the issue in Alvarado, age remains a
permissible- although clearly not mandatory- consideration in
determining custody with respect to any interrogation of a minor,
whether at school or elsewhere.
172
168. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 675.
172. But see C.S.C. v. State, 118 P.3d 970, 978 (Wyo. 2005) (holding that the age of
a sixteen-year-old student suspect need not be considered in custody inquiry where
the student was repeatedly told that he was not under arrest, was not obligated to
answer questions, and could leave at any time).
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Writing for the Alvarado majority, Justice Kennedy stated
that consideration of the suspect's age (or other individual
characteristics) "could be viewed as creating a subjective
inquiry,"' which would be inconsistent with the objective test the
Court has traditionally announced regarding custody. This
objectivity is valued because "it gives clear guidance to the
police."174 Considering the age of a student-suspect questioned at
school, whether by a law enforcement officer or school
administrator, would not present a significant risk of
compromising the clarity the Court has sought to provide to law
enforcement. Officers questioning students at school are well
aware of the students' status as minors. As to elementary and
middle-school students, their minority is virtually certain and
their susceptibility to coercion great. Even as to high school
students, the assumption that they are minors is correct in the
overwhelming majority of cases. Given their familiarity with
students in the schools they serve, SROs are likely to know the
age of any student they question, especially if they are
investigating a crime or have questioned the student in the past.
Outside officers conducting interviews at schools are likely doing
so only when they are looking for a specific student and thus are
likely to already know the student's age. Even if they do not,
these officers rely on school staff to assist them in establishing
contact with the student. These staff members, of course, have
access to the student's records, which will include the age. 7 Seen
in this context, courts considering the age of the suspect are not
imposing an extra burden of intuition or information on officers
but are instead seeing the interrogation in its full context, as it is
likely seen by those involved.
The consideration of age is especially important with respect
to questioning by police in the school setting. Adolescence is a
stage in life during which an individual youth redefines her
relationships with authority figures. A student's development
toward maturity and independence can be charted by reference to
173. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669.
174. Id.
175. The decision to interview a student at school could be made to take advantage
of the student's minority. Questioning the student at school, the officer not only
takes advantage of the student's compulsory presence at school and the background
norm of submission to authority, but also chooses to interact with the student at a
time when the student will not be in the presence of a parent, the figure most likely
to have the inclination or ability to either arrange for the presence of counsel or to
advise the youth to refuse to answer the officer's questions.
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the transformation of his relationships with teachers, principals,
and other authority figures, such as SROs. Recent research
suggests that youth under the age of fifteen are substantially
more likely to be intimidated by authority than are older
adolescents and young adults."' Intensely oriented to the
present, early and middle stage adolescents are especially likely
to feel the event of interrogation as a terminal point, something
from which they will not be able to escape, even if an older
individual, subjected to the same circumstances might readily
appreciate the transitory nature of the situation. The Berkemer
Court held that traffic stops do not equate to custody because
they are brief and that brevity is something that the stopped
individual knows and appreciates. 177 Thus, there is no cause for
the driver to feel overwhelmed and thus incapable of resisting
any pressure that might be perceived from an officer's questions.
To the extent that being young is likely to alter a student's time-
horizon and impair the ability to appreciate what might seem
obvious to the more mature, any custody inquiry that is intended
to accurately capture the experience of the questioned youth must
give due regard to the student's age and immaturity. Because the
investigations in question arise within the school setting, the
benefits of considering age do not come at the cost of making
unreasonable demands on the police to discern the suspect's
vulnerability.
3. MIRANDA SHOULD APPLY TO QUESTIONING BY SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS ONLY WHEN THE ACTIONS OF AN
ADMINISTRATOR OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
COMMUNICATE TO THE STUDENT BEING QUESTIONED THAT
SHE IS SUBJECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
a. The Relationships Between Principals and Students
are Radically Different From the Norm at the Time
T.L.O. Was Decided
The T.L.O. Court explained its grant of latitude to school
administrators in part by reference to the Court's traditional
respect for "the value of preserving the informality of the student-
176. Thomas Grisso, et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 333,
363 (2003).
177. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 473 (1984).
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m. ,,171teacher relationship. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell
developed this theme even further in explaining why
constitutional criminal procedure should have limited application
to the school setting:
The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren
operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects .... Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship exist between school authorities and pupils.
Instead, there is a commonality of interest between teachers
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher 179 is one
of personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as
for his education.8 0
The growth of school-law enforcement collaborations and
parallel developments with respect to school discipline have
reconfigured the role and authority of school administrators.
Under the traditional model of school administration, a principal
who learned that a student might have violated the criminal law
would be responsible for making the decision as to an appropriate
disciplinary sanction as well as whether or not to refer the matter
to law enforcement. Justice Powell assumed that "the student's
welfare," would be a significant consideration in the
178. New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 339-340 (1985).
179. It is telling that Justice Powell, like the T.L.O. majority, chose to invoke
teachers rather than principals in his romanticized comparison between school
authorities and police officers. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-340 (focusing on the
informality of the student-teacher relationship); see also Id. at 349-50 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting the special relationship between student and teacher). Principals
have always been responsible for imposing discipline on students. That discipline is
typically more drastic than that imposed by teachers. Moreover, unlike teachers,
whose sanctions are integrated into a series of ongoing, daily interactions, principals
often find their relationships with students defined primarily by the imposition of
discipline. As the discipline imposed by administrators has become both more severe
and more automatic, the frailty of Powell's analogy to the caring teacher has become
more pronounced.
180. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring). Kagan also highlights this
quote, but his discussion of T.L.O.'s flaws centers on the court's assumption that
"firm boundaries separate schools and the rest of society." Kagan, supra note 6, at
294. Devoted to demonstrating the deviation of modern Fourth Amendment
applications of T.L.O. from the administrative search doctrine on which the opinion
was premised, Kagan's attention turns to the more elevated level of the policy behind
school-law enforcement collaboration. See id. at 296-316 (discussing whether a
search policy has a justification beyond ordinary law enforcement). Because of
Miranda doctrine addresses different concerns, this article focuses on the ground-
level operation of school-based law enforcement. Id.
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administrator's exercise of her discretion.18' Modern principals
often find themselves deprived of discretion with respect to either
course of action. Zero tolerance policies frequently prescribe
mandatory and often harsh disciplinary action without the
opportunity for mitigation based on the circumstances of theS182
incident or the student's disciplinary record. Likewise, when
police officers are assigned to schools, they frequently become the
first and final authority with respect to whether criminal justice
intervention is warranted. 3  The views of principals may be
ignored, if they are ever sought.
In addition, it is no longer accurate to say, as Justice Powell
wrote in T.L.O., that principals have "no obligation to be familiar
with the criminal laws."' 84 Principals in some jurisdictions are
required to report certain forms of criminal conduct to the
police, 5 and other laws require that principals be informed by
law enforcement or judicial agencies about certain information
regarding their students.8 8 It is also quite common now for
prosecutors' offices to assign individual prosecutors to work with
specific schools or schools generally, thus making it easier for
administrators to be as familiar with the criminal laws as the
modern conception of their job requires. 187 Justice Powell's image
181. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring).
182. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, OPPORTUNITIES
SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE POLICIES 1 (2000), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/dis
cipline/final report.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
183. See COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 80 (discussing tensions which arise as a
result of having officers in the classroom).
184. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 n.1.
185. See Pinard, supra note 7, at n.58 (providing an extensive list of examples of
such requirements).
186. See Kristen Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings:
Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520,
247-50 (2004) (providing a discussion of states that either permit or require law
enforcement personnel to notify schools when students have been arrested).
187. See Montgomery County Maryland State Attorney's Office Home Page,
http://www.communityprosecution.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2006) (announcing that
they have assigned "a prosecutor as liaison for every school in our county"); Hennepin
County, Minnesota, Hennepin County Attorney Home Page, http'//www.hennepinat
torney.org/safescho.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2006) (assigning a liaison for every
secondary school who is "available throughout the school year for ongoing advise and
consultation about legal issues relating to juveniles and school-related crime"); King
County, Washington, King County Prosecuting Attorney Web Page, http://www.met
rokc.gov/proatty/schools/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2006) (describing King County
Prosecutor's School Violence Program).
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of the caring teacher stands in stark contrast with the principal
whose relationship with school police was described in the SRO
Assessment as follows: "[officers] work closely with school
administrators in matters that may involve an arrest .... The
SRO and assistant principal.., refer cases to each other 8-10
times a month and collaborate on solving them."8 8 Rather than
appearing in students' eyes as Head Teacher-the repository of
the institution's wishes that the student be educated, 1 89 principals
such as these, must appear to be as much a law enforcement
figure as an educator. 
9 °
b. When Law Enforcement Authority Informs the
Questioning, Miranda Should Apply Even to Questions
Asked by School Administrators
There is no basis for applying Miranda when school
administrators question students and the administrators have
the informal, familiar, and supportive relationship with students
hypothesized in T.L.O. and have nothing more than an
intermittent, albeit collegial, relationship with law enforcement.
It is unrealistic, however, to assume that a modern student,
especially a student suspected of misconduct, would view a
principal as someone looking out for her interests, in the way that
the suspects in the Mauro line of cases viewed the relatives or
friends who questioned them.'9' Even more dramatic change has
188. CASE STUDIES, supra note 2, at 53.
189. See Christopher Edley, Jr. & Johanna Wald, The Hidden Dropout Crisis,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (2004), http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp
.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=35101 (last visited Apr. 19, 2006) (stating that the increased
pressure on school administrators generated by high-stakes testing has further
degraded many administrator-student relationships); PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE
CITY OF NEW YORK & ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, PUSHING OUT AT-RISK STUDENTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH SCHOOL DISCHARGE FIGURES (2002), http://www.advocatesfo
rchildren.org/pubs/pushout-11-20-02.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2006) (providing
evidence which suggests that many student discharges may be examples in which
students are forced out); Press Release, ACLU, Minority Students Nationwide are
Caught in "School-to-Prison" Pipeline, http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/edu/15917prs
20050623.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2006). The ACLU of South Dakota recently filed
a lawsuit against a district in that state alleging that "[through] its discriminatory
practices, the Winner School District systematically pushes Native American
children out of its schools, often into the juvenile justice system." Id.
190. See In re Jesus T., No. F045909, 2005 WL 1390316 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June
15, 2005) (noting that the principal accompanied SROs on trip to students'
neighborhood to assist officers in locating suspects who may have painted graffiti at
school).
191. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mauro
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taken place with respect to the second relationship we must
examine, that between the police and the school. The increased
and highly publicized collaboration between schools and law
enforcement makes it natural for students questioned by
administrators in the presence of school-based officers to assume
that the administrators and law enforcement are in fact working
together with respect to the investigation at hand. This does not
mean that every exchange between a principal and a student in a
school with an SRO is custodial interrogation, even when the
officer has participated to some extent in the investigation. It
does mean, however, that courts must recognize what schools
make little effort to deny in other circumstances: that law
enforcement, generally, and school resource officers, specifically,
are partners of the administration.
Because custody is a legal status linked to the power to
arrest, it is essential to maintain an analytical focus on the role of
law enforcement power even when a student is questioned by
school officials. Neither the severity of an administrator's tone
nor the threat of some sanction if a student opts not to speak
makes Miranda pertinent. If such questioning is to come within
Miranda's ambit at all, it should not be because the questioning
is similar to that which might be conducted by police. Instead, it
should be because the questioning is conducted within a
framework that manifests actual law enforcement authority. A
method for classifying the elements of such authority is set out
below, after a discussion of alternative approaches to the
question.
Questioning by school officials would plainly be exempt from
Miranda's requirements pursuant to one often-stated test, which
excludes from Miranda's reach questioning by any individual who
is not employed by an agency whose "primary mission is to
enforce the law."92  Professor LaFave has proposed a
countervailing and broadly inclusive test bringing within
Miranda's ambit "questioning by any government employee...
whenever prosecution of the defendant being questioned is among
the purposes definite or contingent for which the information is
elicited."93 These two approaches share the flaw of looking at the
case.
192. State v. Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 694-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
193. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.10(c), at 624 (2d ed. 1999)
(quoting United States v. D.F., 63 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995). The cases that LaFave
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question from the perspective of the questioner without due
regard for the perspective of the suspect. Citing LaFave, but with
a slight adaptation, the Washington Supreme Court has found
Miranda applicable to questioning by state actors in
circumstances in which a reasonable person would view the
questioners to be "'law enforcement officers' with authority over
him or her."194 This formulation is an improvement on the two
approaches already noted in this paragraph because it restores
the suspect focus essential to Miranda analysis and because, true
to Perkins, it directs attention to whether the suspect would be
reasonable in believing that the questioner wielded law
enforcement authority. Even under this approach, however,
questioning by school officials would remain outside Miranda's
reach, as the officials themselves would not reasonably be seen as
law enforcement officers.
Modern law enforcement-education collaborations must be
examined through a different lens precisely because law
enforcement officers and the coercive authority they represent
and deploy often figure prominently in the interrogation process
even when the officers do not ask student suspects any questions.
Thus, the crucial facts in determining Miranda's applicability to
schoolhouse interrogations by school administrators include the
nature of the officer's involvement and his or her background
relationships to the questioner and the student suspect. Just as
an SRO's collaboration with school personnel and interactions
with students may soften the otherwise coercive or custodial
nature of an SRO-student encounter, so may administrator-SRO
collaboration transform a principal-student encounter from
purely administrative or even tutelary in nature to something
highly coercive and potentially custodial, depending upon the
circumstances. The complexity of these inter-relationships makes
relies on are a dubious foundation for the broad test he proposes. Mathis v. U.S., 391
U.S. 1 (1968), involving questioning by agents from the IRS,lookstoday like an
artifact of post-Miranda exuberance. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), a
court-appointed psychiatrist appears to have perhaps misunderstood and certainly to
have drastically exceeded his mandate. The need to rectify that overreaching, rather
than any broader principle, drives the opinion.
194. State v. Heritage, 95 P.3d 345, 448 (Wa. 2004). In the course of reaching this
conclusion, the Heritage court abrogated a long-standing and oft-cited intermediate
appellate court ruling, People v. Wolfer, that essentially adopted the test of People v.
Wright. People v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 154 (Wa. App. 1984) (adopting approach from
Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d at 692). The Heritage court went on to find that the suspect
in the case before it was not in custody, and that therefore, the absence of warnings
did not require suppression. Heritage, 95 P.3d at 349.
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courts' typical narrow perspective on these issues particularly
unhelpful. Often, courts will ask only if the school official was
acting as "an instrument or agent of the police,"95 as if only the
purely officer-dependent principal would communicate the
presence of law enforcement authority within the questioning. In
fact, it is the collaborating principal, the one who is routinely
vested with the authority of a collaborating law enforcement
officer, who figures to be most coercive in students' eyes.
Murphy, Mauro, and Perkins remain reliable guideposts to
resolving these issues. 196 When no officer is involved in any way,
questioning by a principal is even further removed from
Miranda's concerns than was the probation officer's inquiry in
Murphy.'97 Both the probation officer and the principal have
considerable authority over those whom they are charged to
oversee. Both can require their subjects to be in their presence
and can bring about considerable sanctions for disfavored
behavior. Probation officers are generally accorded vast
discretion to set the terms by which the probationer must
conform while at liberty, and they retain the power to seek
revocation and its likely consequence, incarceration. Principals
have broad authority with respect to what students may or may
not do while at school, and they also exercise the power to keep
students after school or to suspend or expel them. Nevertheless,
acting exclusively on their own authority, they do not have the
power to impose the sort of long-term and indeterminate isolation
that brings with it Miranda's concerns about coercion.
Even when an officer is involved in orchestrating or
otherwise contributing to a principal's questions, Miranda
concerns are not implicated as long as the officer's involvement is
hidden from the student. There is no need or even basis for
inquiring into the existence of custody because the student is not
subject to intimidation rooted in a fear of law enforcement
authority any more than the inmate in Perkins was.' 9' This
observation illustrates another way in which the LaFave test
applying Miranda to questioning, for which prosecution was
195. State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580, 583 (N.H. 1998).
196. See supra Part II.C. for a discussion of those three cases.
197. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (noting that the student's prior
familiarity with his probation officer, who questioned him, was relevant to the
custody inquiry).
198. See supra Parts II.A., II.C., and II.B. for discussion of Perkins.
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"among the purposes of the questioner," fails. 99 The principal
acting entirely on her own and the principal discreetly carrying
out the wishes of a hidden police officer present the same show of
authority to their respective students, and neither example
implicates Miranda.
Where a school-based officer is involved in the investigation
leading up to the questioning and this involvement is apparent to
200
the student, however, neither Murphy nor Perkins controls.
The Supreme Court recognized in Murphy that the simple fact
that questions were asked by someone who is not a police officer
does not necessarily bring the questioning outside Miranda,
provided the conditions of custody existed.201 A principal involved
in collaboration with school-based law enforcement stands in a
202
very different posture than did the suspect's wife in Mauro.
Unlike Mauro's wife, the principal has a strong affiliation with
the police, one that is known to and likely to influence the
student being questioned. In fact, unless the principal actively
disavows the collaboration, it is hard to believe that the student
would view the questioning as not in fact closely linked to the
officer's law enforcement responsibilities.
Like the custodial nature of SRO-student encounters
described earlier, the significance of law enforcement authority
within incidents of questioning by school administrators can be
represented graphically. Figure 2 provides a simple reminder
that the analysis of such questioning is more complicated because
three different relationships need to be examined here,
administrator-student, administrator-officer, and officer-student.
The first interaction to be examined in such situations is that
between the administrator and the student. Figure 2a marks the
way in which a principal's authority may range from tutelary to
authoritative. Figure 2b illustrates how, through a variety of
199. See supra note 209 and accompanying text for a discussion of the test
recommended by LaFave.
200. See generally Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (focusing on the
admissibility of statements that the defendant made to his wife while in custody).
201. Murphy, 465 U.S. at n.5 ("We emphasize that Murphy was not under arrest
and that he was free to leave at the end of the meeting. A different question would
be presented if he had been interviewed by his probation officer while being held in
police custody .... ). The court found that Murphy's prior relationship with his
probation officer insulated him from psychological intimidation that might overbear
his desire to claim the privilege. Id.
202. See supra Part II.C. for a discussion of Mauro.
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circumstances, a principal's questioning may become infused with
law enforcement authority. If the administrator invokes or even
seems to deploy the authority of the law enforcement officer, by
stating, for example, "Officer Jones and I are both looking to find
out...," she transforms the traditional principal-student contact
into a law enforcement incident meriting Miranda analysis. With
each additional measure of law enforcement involvement,
indicated by the blocks in Figure 2b, the principal's authority
moves away from the tutelary and toward the coercive.
Fully assessing the situation requires one to look at the
other two sides of the triangle as well. The relationship between
the officer and the administrator is significant, with respect to
the extent and tenor of collaboration between them at the school
generally and also in this particular investigation. If the officer
apprehends the student and brings him to the principal's office,
and if this school is one in which the principal and the officer
present themselves to the school community as part of a law
enforcement team, then even if the officer steps away briefly
during question, his or her presence is unlikely to be forgotten by
the student. Where an officer with a minimal law enforcement
role at a school merely drops by the office during the course of an
interview, law enforcement authority adds little to the
coerciveness of the setting. Finally, consistent with the
discussion of Alvarado, the nature of the relationship between the
203officer and the student must also be considered. A student with
a history of coercive encounters with an officer is likely to register
the officer's presence during a principal's questioning quite
differently from a student with no such history.
203. See supra Part II.B.2. for a discussion of Alvarado.
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IV. THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH URGED HERE
ADDRESSES THE WIDE RANGE OF SITUATIONS
COMMON IN TODAY'S SCHOOLS
A. AN SRo QUESTIONS A STUDENT:
How RELATIONSHIPS MATTER
The following hypothetical variations on a single student-
officer interaction illustrate how the relationship focus set out
above offers a workable, contextually valid approach to school-
based interrogation by SROs. The hypothetical facts leading up
to the encounter with the student suspect are set out in the
following paragraphs. The dialogues that follow provide three
different ways the encounter might proceed.
John Hardy is an officer with the Metropolitan Police
Department. For the last year, he has been designated School
Resource Officer for Lincoln Middle School. Occasionally called
away from the school to assist with emergencies, he is otherwise
at Lincoln from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. every day that school is in
session. He has been trained in the TRIAD model of school
policing and tries to make himself a regular and constructive
presence in the school environment and at school events. In
addition to his law enforcement and safety responsibilities, he
assists school personnel by lecturing or otherwise teaching
elements of their courses that the teachers believe might benefit
from his perspective. He also attends school events such as pep
rallies, athletic and academic contests when he can. He takes the
counseling component of the TRIAD approach just as seriously as
he does the law enforcement component. When he hears of a
student causing trouble, he will seek that student out to let him
know he (Officer Hardy) is watching. Likewise, when he hears of
a student having trouble with bullies or difficulties at home, he
will seek that student out as well to see if there is anything he
can do to assist or, at a minimum, to let the student know she
need not feel alone or abandoned.
Officer Hardy is investigating a series of car break-ins in the
school parking lot. His weekly School Safety Report-sent to all
students, teachers, and staff and posted on the school website-
announces that anyone with information related to these break-
ins should contact him. In the course of his investigation, Officer
Hardy contacts students wherever he finds them, including the
hallway, the cafeteria, and the parking lot. Within three days
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after the Safety Report is published, he has focused his suspicion
on a group of boys who are known to "hang out" in a certain
corner of the parking lot both before and after school. Jimmy
Wright is a member of this group of boys. On the afternoon of the
third day after the Safety Report went out, Officer Hardy sees
Jimmy talking with several other students as they wait in the
cafeteria line. Dressed in his Police Department shirt, with his
badge on his chest, as he is every day, Hardy approaches the
group. He is not armed. He keeps his gun secured in his office.
He has never pulled it out at school. He removes it from the
office only when leaving school, either to end his shift or to
answer emergency calls away from the building.
A STUDENT RESOURCE OFFICER INTERROGATES A STUDENT
VERSION ONE
Officer Hardy has had limited contact with Jimmy Wright.
They have rarely spoken to each other. Hardy knows Jimmy's
name, as he does that of virtually all of the students in school.
On a few occasions, Hardy has had to direct Jimmy and his
friends to disperse from the corner of the parking lot. While the
students have not responded cheerily to these actions, they have
not caused any trouble either.
Officer Hardy: [Hardy approaches Jimmy in the
cafeterialinel "Hey there Jimmy. Got
a minute? I'd like to talk to you."
Jimmy: "It won't take a minute. I've got
nothing to say to you."
Officer Hardy: "Slow down, young man. You don't
even know what I want to talk with
you about."
Jimmy: "It's got to be those car break-ins.
That's what you've been talking to
everyone else about, isn't it?"
Officer Hardy: "So you've been researching my
conversations. You might be better
off putting that sort of energy into
your schoolwork. Let's go down to
my office and talk."
[Hardy points toward the cafeteria door. Jimmy heads in
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that direction and Hardy follows close behind him. When they
get to Hardy's office, around the corner from the cafeteria, Hardy
opens the door with a key. He directs Jimmy to a seat and then
shuts the door, seating himself between Jimmy and the door.
There are no windows looking out to the hallways of the school.
There is a window which does not open and which looks out on a
small courtyard which is not open to students. Hardy's handcuffs
are on his desk.
Officer Hardy: I know you'd rather be out there
dazzling the young ladies in the
lunch line, but as it is right now, I
need you to tell me everything you
know about the break-ins.
VERSION TWO
Officer Hardy has had a fair amount of contact with Jimmy.
Hardy taught a unit on Law Enforcement and Community
Relations in Jimmy's Social Studies class. Hardy noticed that
Jimmy seldom did his homework but that he was quite bright, if
also a little undisciplined during class discussions. Jimmy
volunteered to play the Police Chief role in a simulated
community meeting that was part of the unit. When he played it
straight, he did a good job. Since that time, Hardy has kept an
eye out for Jimmy. He has checked in with the Social Studies
teacher and has occasionally pulled Jimmy aside to see how he is
doing. On two occasions, they have met in Hardy's office and
talked. Jimmy has hinted at problems at home but has usually
done so in the nearly wordless way of many teenage boys. Hardy
has not pushed the matter, for fear of alienating the boy.
Officer Hardy: [Hardy approaches Jimmy in the
cafeterialine] "Hey there Jimmy. Got a
minute? I'd like to talk to you."
Jimmy: "I don't think so. Not right now. I'm
hungry. I did not have breakfast this
morning."
Officer Hardy: "I'm sorry to hear that, but how can you
know you don't want to talk with me
when you don't even know what I want
to talk with you about."
"It's got to be those car break-ins.
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Officer Hardy:
That's what you've been talking to
everyone else about, isn't it?"
"So you've been researching my
conversations. I don't remember you
putting that kind of effort into your
Social Studies assignments when I
was helping with that class. I just
need you for a few minutes. I checked
with the lunch crew. They bought
extra burgers today, so I am sure
they'll still have some when you get
back."
[Hardy directs his eyes toward his office and starts walking
that way. Jimmy follows. When they get to Hardy's office, around
the corner from the cafeteria, Hardy opens the door with a key.
He directs Jimmy to a seat. He then shuts the door, moves
around Jimmy and takes a seat behind his desk, facing Jimmy
and the door. There are no windows looking out to the hallways
of the school. There is a window which does not open and which
looks out on a small courtyard which is not open to students.
Hardy's handcuffs are on his desk.
Officer Hardy: "I think you know why I asked you
to come in. I want you to tell me
what you know about the break-ins.
Once we're done, you can head back
to the cafeteria and grab your
burgers. I am sure the young ladies
you were talking to in line will save
you a seat."
VERSION THREE
Officer Hardy has had frequent contact with Jimmy, starting
almost immediately after he took on the SRO position. Jimmy is
regularly seen walking the halls when he should be in class.
While monitoring the halls for "cutters" is not Hardy's job, if he
sees a student out during class, he will direct him/her to get to
class. Hardy has such encounters with Jimmy weekly. Usually,
Jimmy walks toward class without comment, but, occasionally,
especially if he has an audience, he will act disrespectfully. When
that happens, Hardy will admonish him and, if necessary, send
him to the principal's office.
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About six weeks ago, Hardy saw Jimmy purchase marijuana
from another student just outside the school building during
school hours. Hardy approached Jimmy, put a hand on his
shoulder and steered him to Hardy's office where he asked him to
hand over the marijuana, which Jimmy promptly did, saying, "It's
just some weed." He placed Jimmy under arrest and referred the
case to the Prosecuting Attorney. Hardy also informed the
principal, who suspended Jimmy for five days. About a week
after the suspension, Hardy walked outside to his police car at
the end of his shift and found an image of a marijuana plant
smeared on his rear windshield in mud apparently taken from
the wet grounds nearby.
The next day, Hardy had a member of the office staff send a
message to Jimmy's teacher that he was to report to Officer
Hardy's office right away. Jimmy showed up. Hardy closed the
door and told Jimmy that he hoped he enjoyed his little joke.
Jimmy said he did not know what Hardy was talking about.
Hardy told him he did not have to worry, that he was not even
going to try to prove that Jimmy and his buddies had marked up
the car. He just wanted to make sure Jimmy understood he
would not forget this.
Officer Hardy: [Hardy approaches Jimmy in the
cafeteria line] "Hey there Jimmy. Let's
go to my office for a minute. I want to
talk to you."
Jimmy: "Not now. I want to eat."
Officer Hardy: "The sooner we take care of this, the
better it will be, for you and me both."
Jimmy: "How's it going to be better for me to
give up my place in line, go down to
your office, tell you I don't know
anything about anybody breaking into
any cars, then come back here and
wait in a longer line and maybe not
even have time to finish my lunch
before I have to go take some stupid
test in my English class?"
Officer Hardy: "I didn't say anything about any
break-ins, but you, you're a smart
guy. Smart enough to handle an
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English test on a half-empty stomach,
if that's where you find yourself a
half-hour from now."
[Hardy puts his hand on Jimmy's forearm and steers him out
of the line and toward the door of the cafeteria.]
[The setting of the office is the same as in Version One, and,
as in that Version, Hardy seats himself between Jimmy and
the door]
Jimmy: So, what, you're still mad about your car,
so you're going to arrest me for this other
stuff? That's messed up.
Officer Hardy:
Jimmy:
Officer Hardy:
"Who said anything about arrest? Let's
just say that I think you know something
about these stolen cars and I didn't think
you'd be straight with me out there in
front of your audience."
"So, I'm not under arrest? Then, I can
just walk back to the cafeteria now, is
that right?"
"What can you tell me about these car
break-ins? You know I've been
talking to people about them. Your
name keeps coming up. I know you
and your buddies spend a lot of time
out in the parking lot. Maybe that
makes it easy for folks to put the
finger on you-I don't know."
The three vignettes set out above conclude with statements
204
by Officer Hardy that qualify as interrogation. Thus, a court
faced with a Miranda-based Motion to Suppress any statements
Jimmy made in response to this interrogation would need to focus
its attention on the question of whether or not Jimmy was in
custody when interrogated.
Was Jimmy Wright in Custody?
These hypotheticals demonstrate the benefits, even the
204. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (defining interrogation).
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necessity, of considering the prior relationship between officer
and suspect when deciding the question of custody. The divergent
plot paths in the three scenarios can be largely explained by
reference to the different histories described in the opening
paragraphs of each hypothetical. Keeping to the drama metaphor
adopted in Thompson, this history provides essential back-story,
framing the understanding, motivation, and expectations of the
characters.205 Failing to reference this back-story in the course of
reconstructing the scene, a court would be ill-equipped to truly
understand the encounter.
In Version One, SRO Hardy has no meaningful prior
relationship with Jimmy Wright. In Version Two, the relationship
is a positive one, seemingly based on Hardy's genuine concern for
the student rather than his authority over him. Finally, in
Version Three, the history is marked by confrontation. In all
three versions, Jimmy's initial response to Hardy conveys
essentially the same message, i.e., he does not wish to speak to
Officer Hardy. Versions One and Three are quite blunt, with One
almost defiant and Three fairly dismissive. Version Two contains
a milder rejection, offered with an explanation that appears
intended not to justify the decision, but to win the officer's
sympathy.
In turn, in Version Two, Hardy does not need to be quite as
206
forceful because he expects Jimmy to trust him or defer to him.
Hardy's follow-up statements (Row Four) contain a common
message, i.e., I am going to ignore your stated interest in not
speaking with me, but take different paths to deliver it, each in
line with Jimmy's response. In Version Two, the officer says he is
"sorry" that Jimmy missed breakfast, and he asks "how" Jimmy
can be sure he does not want to speak with the Officer when he
does not know what the Officer wants to talk with him about. In
205. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (recreating in the decision
defendant's interrogation by examining transcripts and calling for a similar type of
analysis in other cases). See Film-Term Glossary, http://www.dsiegel.com/film/glossa
ry.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2006) (defining the term backstory). As distinct from
biography and backdrop, backstory includes all relevant events to the protagonist
and antagonist that occurred before the narrative started. Id. In general, it is the
period of time the antagonist has spent concocting his plan of takeover, revenge, etc.
Id. Backstory is the background for the conflict. Id.
206. Cf Grasle v. State, 779 So. 2d 334, 336-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that statement was involuntary because SRO exploited student-suspect's trust in
him and created misleading impression that SRO would protect student from
prosecution).
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Version One, Hardy is neither sympathetic nor inquiring but
remains conversational "Slow down, young man. You don't even
know.... ." In Version Three Hardy lacks even the pretense of
manners or civility. His aggressive statement that "[t]he sooner
we take care of this, the better" leaves little doubt that, one way
or another, he intends to get compliance (and answers) from
Jimmy.
With his final utterance at the cafeteria combined with his
concluding gesture Hardy finally achieves what he wants and the
two of them are on their way to the office. Versions One and Two
are similar (an apparent attempt at a joke related to Jimmy's
study habits). In Version Three, rather than gently putting
Jimmy down, Hardy offers sarcastic, mocking false praise ("smart
guy"). He then ominously suggests that Jimmy may not even be
permitted to attend his upcoming class, a statement which
conveys that the discussion Hardy intends to have with Jimmy is
likely to be both lengthy and consequential. That comment
contrasts starkly with the way Hardy wraps up this segment of
Version Two, where he lets Jimmy know that the conversation
should be short and that he will soon be back to what he was
doing before, much like a driver pulled over for a traffic stop, as
in Berkemer, who expects to be back in the car and on the way
again once the ticket is written. On the other hand, Hardy's
"insinuation" in Version Three that Jimmy might not be
attending his English class fits within what the Murphy Court
recognized above as a hallmark of coercive custodial
207interrogation.
The significance of the scene of the questioning also bears
the mark of the prior encounters. In all three versions, Hardy
has removed Jimmy from an open public setting, where he was
not only visible to but actually engaged with others, to a private
setting where he can neither see nor be seen by anyone but
Hardy. This contrast with the facts in Berkemer strengthens the
argument for custody in the present example.2 °8 With respect to
207. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (stating that "[c]ustodial arrest
is said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the
officers' will and to confess" and that "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation
derives in large measure from an interrogator's insinuations that the interrogation
will continue until a confession is obtained").
208. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) ("[Ihe only relevant inquiry is
how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation.").
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209Version Two, however, the student's familiarity with the office,
and the history of consensual, non-coercive conversations there
undermine a custody claim. In fact, one would expect (and a
prosecutor could easily prove, if permitted) that Hardy sat at his
desk and Jimmy in the chair during these earlier talks. Thus, not
only is the office itself familiar to the student, but so is the
arrangement.
In Version Three, on the other hand, Jimmy's associations
with Hardy's office are not at all benign. In one prior instance,
Hardy walked him there, hand on shoulder as in this incident,
and arrested him. On another occasion, Hardy delivered the
threat that he would be watching Jimmy. In light of this history
and the fact that Hardy takes a seat between Jimmy and the
door, thereby effectively locking the student in the room, the
atmosphere is highly constraining. The physical arrangement,
i.e., the staging, is the same in Version One, and that student
would certainly feel as if he could not leave. One difference
between the two situations is that the student in Version One
does not have any particular reason to worry about how Hardy
will treat him, whereas, given the history between them, it would
be reasonable for a student in the shoes of Version Three Jimmy
to consider himself a walking target of Officer Hardy and to see
the current incident as Hardy's way of finally taking aim.
This is not to say that back-story is destiny, and that any
time an officer approaches a student he has arrested or coercively
interrogated in the past, the situation is necessarily custodial. In
both of the vignettes in which there was a history between the
officer and the student (Version Two and Three) the officer's
behavior (use of force, tone and substance of comments) was
consistent with the spirit of the prior relationship. Where the
facts of the encounter under review by a court are discordant with
the prior relationship, that fact itself will likely be quite weighty
in the custody determination. Thus, an officer with reason to
believe that a student will fear his approach can easily dissipate
the fear and the possible custodial nature of the situation by
addressing it directly-"Look, Jimmy, I know we've had problems
in the past, but I am not here to talk with you about the past.
209. See, Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (noting that the student's
prior familiarity with probation officer weighed against finding the person who
questioned him and the place of the questioning underminedc claim that he was
entitled to Miranda's protection).
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You are not under arrest. We are just talking. You know that I
am trying to catch whoever has been breaking into the cars in the
parking lot. I think that you may know something. If you do, I'd
like you to tell me."210 This statement, by itself, would not be
enough to defeat a claim of custody, in that merely telling a
suspect he is not under arrest does not necessarily communicate
that the suspect is free to terminate the interrogation and leave.
Evidence of a statement such as this, however, would certainly
undermine a defense claim that the tenor of the prior relationship
between the officer and the suspect rendered the situation
custodial. Conversely, a student with only benign experience
with the officer (Version Two) would likely experience an even
greater sense of restraint if the officer approached and spoke to
him as Hardy did in Version Three. The discordance between the
history and the current situation would communicate a clear
message that the officer will insist on answers to his questions.
Discussion: What difference does Miranda make?
These hypotheticals illustrate the priority that the approach
urged here places on a student-suspect's experience of an officer's
authority. The officer's title and the setting of the interrogation
are factors in the inquiry, but neither they nor the abstract
objectives behind the placement of officers in schools are
determinative. When courts invoke T.L.O. as a basis for
liberating SROs from Miranda, they are formalistically
substituting an all-purpose, all-places conclusion for a serious
analysis of the extent to which those policy objectives are
demonstrably affecting students' experiences. This is unwise as a
matter of policy because the assumption that SRO practice is
uniform and entirely consistent with the highest aspirations of its
proponents is unfounded. The avoidance of this ground-level
analysis is also unnecessary as the nature of the facts to be
considered and the determinations to be made in such cases are
not different in kind or degree from those courts are familiar with
in the suppression setting. For example, in Fourth Amendment
suppression cases, courts routinely consider evidence intended to
establish that a specific neighborhood is a "high crime area," and
this fact is then relied on by the government to explain the
reasonableness of an officer's interpretation of purportedly
210. See In re Douglas S., No. B164432, 2003 WL 22753594 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
2003) (finding no custody where SRO told student that he was investigating an arson
case and asked him if he knew the person responsible).
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suspicious although often ambiguous behavior.211  The inquiry
into the nature of the police culture within a particular school is
more susceptible to being proven than the character of a
neighborhood. Certainly, the officers cannot claim ignorance of
the culture which they play such a large role in establishing.
Under the approach urged here, a court should find that the
suspects in Versions One and Two of the hypothetical were not in
custody. Version Three, however, presents a long list of factors in
support of the conclusion that the student was in custody and
therefore Officer Hardy should have read the Miranda warnings
before engaging in his final ploy to obtain the information-
pretending sympathy for the suspect's situation, with the
implication that with more information he can help the suspect
out of his present difficulties. This ratio, two non-custodial, one
custodial, overestimates the burden that Miranda is likely to
impose on SRO activity. If the conversation had taken place in
the hallway, an empty classroom, or a gymnasium, the
conversation described in these scenarios would not qualify as
212
custodial. Had Hardy made any genuine effort, at any point in
the conversation, to re-direct the tone from the authoritative
pitch he first chose, the entire encounter might have played out
differently. And, assuming that SROs will have positive
relationships with most of the students in their schools, they will
only occasionally face situations, such as that shown in Version
Three, in which the student-officer history negatively colors an
encounter and pushes it toward custody.
B. WHEN A PRINCIPAL ASKS THE QUESTIONS: WHO'S IN THE
ROOM, WHAT Do THEY Do, AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
The need for a properly triangulated analysis of
interrogation by school administrators working with law
enforcement is apparent from a recent Florida case, State v.
J. T.D. 213  The interrogation concerned an allegation that a
student had committed a lewd or offensive touching of another
211. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (noting that the "fact that the stop
occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a
Terry analysis") (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972)).
212. It does not follow from this that no interrogation can ever be custodial if it
occurs in such a location. The example of Orozco v. Texas, in which custody was
established in the suspect's bedroom cautions against looking for any specific type of
location which could never be custodial. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969).
213. State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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214
student. The SRO assigned to the school had begun
investigating the allegation the previous day, before any school
official was involved. It was an assistant principal, however,
who first questioned the student, and she did so in her office.216
The SRO was present during parts of the questioning including
the moment when the student admitted touching the other
217
student. The trial court granted the student's motion to
suppress, finding that although the principal was not acting as an
agent of law enforcement, the two investigations, i.e., the school
and law enforcement investigations were "inextricably
intertwined"' and that the student was in custody for Miranda
purposes at the time of the questioning. The Florida Court of
Appeals reversed, stating:
Establishing a blanket rule that excludes the presence of a
police officer whenever a school administrator questions a
student unless Miranda warnings are given turns a blind eye
to the threatening world surrounding our schools. The
appropriate focus is to examine the actual conduct of the
police officer or school official to determine whether that
conduct transformed the school official's interview into a
custodial interrogation by law enforcement .... By placing
the focus upon the actual conduct of the school official and
the law enforcement officer, those events calling for
immediate action in a school disciplinary setting can be
evaluated with the necessary flexibility consistent with the
219
constitutional guarantee Miranda warnings provide.
The J.T.D. court was correct to reject a "blanket rule" and
also to focus its attention on the "actual conduct" of the school and
220law enforcement actors rather than merely their job titles.
There is nothing in the opinion, however, aside from this agitated
rhetoric, to suggest that the trial court announced any blanket
rule. Moreover, the analysis by the Court of Appeals goes
seriously awry when the court states that it is unnecessary to
make any custody determination because "the clear purpose of
214. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d at 794-95.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 794.
218. Id. at 795; see also In re G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 659 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that Miranda applied to joint investigation by school and police).
219. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d at 797.
220. Id. at 796.
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the interview was to determine whether J.T.D. had breached the
student code of conduct by improperly touching a fellow
student."2 1 What was unmistakably clear to J.T.D. was that the
principal and the SRO both wanted to know whether J.T.D. had
improperly touched the other student. The opinion refers to no
facts by which either the principal or the SRO communicated to
the student that they were looking into this as a disciplinary,
rather than a criminal, matter. In fact, the SROs presence
alongside the principal (one leg of the triangle), even though
intermittent, would likely have communicated that this
investigation would lead to J.T.D.'s involvement in the criminal
or juvenile justice system.
J.T.D.'s reasons to believe he was subject to law enforcement
activity which he was not free to ignore become clearer when one
focuses on the officer-student leg of the triangle. On prior
occasions, the SRO had "warned" J.T.D. that "she had the
authority to send him" to the juvenile detention center "based on
his behavior. ",222  Seeing the officer involved in this current
investigation and hearing from the principal that other students
had implicated him in serious misconduct, any reasonable
student in such circumstances would conclude that the chain of
events leading to his placement in the detention center was well
under way and could not be interrupted. In other words, he was
presently in the initial stages of what would be a lengthy period
of restraint at the hands of the authorities. Had the officer not
been involved in the student's interrogation at all, for instance,
had the officer not been the one to bring him to the office or not
returned at all during the questioning, the principal's questioning
223would not have been cloaked in law enforcement authority.
Likewise, if the officer had not previously raised the specter of the
detention center in her interactions with this student, her
presence would not have been as intimidating. To accept the
position urged by the J.T.D. court is tantamount to saying that a
reasonable student in J.T.D.'s position would believe that he was
221. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d at 796. See also supra note 209 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Professor LaFave's proposed rule. See supra notes 17-25 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the R.H. opinions.
222. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d at 795.
223. The opinion does not contain much detail as to the specific questions asked or
the tone in which they were asked, and there is no precise description of what the
SRO did or said, where she was positioned, for how long she was present and for how
long she was gone. All of these facts would be crucial in making any determination
of custody.
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free to ignore the principal's questions and go about his business
and that if he chose to do so, the officer would do nothing at all to
restrain him.
The J.T.D. court was not only misdirected in its focus on the
questioner's intent but excessively credulous in discussing the
relationship between the principal and the officer as well. As the
trial court noted, "[wihen J.T.D. made this admission, [the
assistant principal] turned the questioning over to [the SRO] who
started to read J.T.D. the Miranda warnings. This sequence of
events strongly suggests not merely that the two investigations
were "intertwined," as the trial court had ruled, but that the
principal and SRO were purposefully exploiting the principal's
assumed ability to question without warnings and further
assuming that, having given this incriminating statement in the
officer's presence, the student would be less likely to assert his
rights when the officer later administered them. This sequencing
produces troubling echoes of the "confession-first" mode of
interrogation found problematic by the Supreme Court in State v.
Siebert.22" To see what this manipulation looks like, consider the
following excerpt from a different interrogation at a different
school:
I would like to ask you some questions about this gun. You
don't have to answer them if you don't want to. That's up to
you-or you can wait till your dad gets here or whatever you
feel more comfortable-or if you wanna talk now that's fine,
too. You mind if I ask you questions? You've been pretty
honest about (sic) the counselor and principal here. This
(inaudible) BB gun-is that yours or your parents? 226
This excerpt shows how police can and do use the fact of prior
statements to elicit more incriminating statements from students.
The fact that the officer quickly took over the questioning
once the student was effectively trapped by the initial admission
is not directly relevant to the determination of custody at the
moment of the principal's questioning, as later-occurring events
224. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d at 795.
225. State v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Because the "principal-first" approach is
not per se violative of a suspect's rights in the way that "confession-first"
interrogation is, it may not raise as many alarms. In this example, however, it
appears equally calculated to disarm the suspect of any meaningful opportunity or
incentive to assert his constitutional rights.
226. In re G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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cannot affect the way a suspect would interpret the
circumstances of his questioning. Pointing out the way in which
the collaboration between school and law enforcement officials
can exploit students' submissive status and compromise their
position within the criminal and juvenile justice system, however,
is an important rebuttal to the suggestion that school-based
Miranda claims are illegitimate and unworthy. Moreover, the
suspicious timing of the questioning hand-off belies any lingering
shred of the notion espoused by Justice Powell that
227
administrators are not well-versed in the criminal law.
The J.T.D. court did not believe it was necessary to conduct a
true custody analysis because it found the notion of subjecting a• 228
principal's actions to such review too alarming. Thus, it is
impossible to say whether J.T.D. was in custody and should have
received warnings. Nevertheless, this discussion illustrates how
attention to the actual experience of students interrogated within
law-enforcement-saturated schools can result in analysis that
does not hide from what is truly occurring in the schools. Like
the R.H. dissent discussed in Part I, the J.T.D. court expends
great emotion fulminating against straw men, who, it alleges,
would turn "a blind eye to the threatening world surrounding our
schools. ' ,229 Fortunately, we do not face the stark choice of either
ignoring student misconduct or refusing to acknowledge the
coerciveness of the measures currently in place to address it. All
Miranda requires, even under the most expansive interpretation,
is that a principal not extract information from a student through
the exploitation of law enforcement authority in a manner which
creates a risk of coercion equivalent to that attendant upon
arrest. The risk of coercion can be eliminated by (1) advising the
student of his Miranda rights, (2) conducting the interrogation in
a fashion that does not draw on the authority of the law
enforcement officer, or (3) avoiding custodial conditions. The
officer's involvement in the investigation could be kept a secret to
the student. Once such involvement becomes apparent to the
student, the principal can take steps to disavow any power-
sharing or joint operation. The principal could make clear to the
student that he will be permitted to leave the office upon the end
of the interrogation. The principal need not set the student up for
an ambush and could in fact tell the student that the officer may
227. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349-50 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
228. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d at 795.
229. Id. at 797.
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conduct her own questioning or may take action within her own
authority in light of the principal's questions. In fact, such steps
would be most respectful of the student's ability to genuinely
exercise her rights.
C. MIRANDA IN SCHOOLS: THE FINAL ANALYSIS?
Shouldn't principals be spending their time and energy
making sure students know how to write rather than making
sure they know their rights? It is easy enough to predict this
objection and to imagine the vigorous nodding of heads in
affirmation as someone raises it at a high school faculty meeting,
a school board meeting, or a juvenile court judges' meeting. The
implication that applying Miranda in schools would compromise
the safety and learning of the school community is natural but
nevertheless ill-founded. The Miranda doctrine already contains
an exception which renders admissible, despite the absence of
warnings, statements made in response to questions necessary to
230protect public safety from imminent threats. Certainly, any
questions directed at discovering the existence or location of
weapons on school grounds would qualify under this exception.
Consistent with the still-vital aspect of T.L.O. that students'
rights in the school setting should be determined in light of what
is appropriate to that setting, it would make sense for courts to
adopt a robust understanding of this exception, one that would
include the presence of illegal drugs within the definition of
threats to public safety. Even at its most expansive, however,
this exception would not cover many of the investigations that
currently push students from the schoolhouse to the courthouse,
such as those involving already-completed acts of assault,
threats, or the destruction or theft of property.
Recognizing limits on the prosecutorial use of in-custody
statements by students does not leave school authorities or the
officers working with them helpless in responding to
misconduct. 21  The decision to apply Miranda to school-based
230. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) ("We conclude that under the
circumstances involved in this case, overriding considerations of public safety justify
the officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions devoted
to locating the abandoned weapon.").
231. This article has not attempted to argue against the presence of police in
schools. It does seem curious that in a time of increased worry about students'
ability to pass high-stakes tests districts would be permitting officers, i.e., unlicensed
teachers, the opportunity to lead classes on a regular basis. Communities might
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interrogation need not have any implications at all for schools'
disciplinary processes. The principal in J.T.D., for example,
already had sufficient information to justify suspending the
student. It was not necessary to extract the student's admission
before doing so. Even if the principal sought to impose a long-
term suspension, that would only have required that the student
receive the opportunity to speak in his own defense. The minimal
232protections required in Goss v. Lopez should not be transformed
into an escape from Miranda. Even if a particular instance of
questioning violated Miranda, a student's answers would still be
available to school officials seeking to take disciplinary action. If
schools began to provide warnings, it is likely that most youths
would waive their rights, as most do when questioned by police
outside of school. Thus, the amount of information lost due to
Miranda would be slight. As noted earlier, such information
would often be redundant of whatever incriminating information
has led the questioner to suspect the student in the first place.
Given that there are various ways for authorities to
legitimately avoid the requirement to provide Miranda warnings
and students are likely to regularly forgo Miranda's protections,
why, aside from doctrinal purity, would it be worthwhile for
courts to upend the prevailing assumption and apply Miranda
within the modern schoolhouse setting? The most significant
reason is actually a reflection of the insight behind the TRIAD
SRO model. The developers of this approach have consciously
established the goal of transforming the nature of relations
between police and youth. The use of the school setting as the
platform for this transformation reflects the recognition that
students learn outside the classroom as well as in. Requiring
Miranda warnings where appropriate in the school setting
provides a valuable civics lesson: that authority in a democracy
should be exercised transparently and with appropriate checks
beyond those of self-restraint. Far more than courts or school
determine, however, that any fall-off with respect to instruction is outweighed by the
benefits to the entire community from the greater degree of order achieved in schools
with a regular police presence. The SRO study discussed within this article offers
what is best seen as only a beginning in terms of data with regard to how the police
presence affects school environments.
232. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 571 (1975) (holding that students were entitled to
due process protection prior to a suspension and should be given notice of changes
and an opportunity to be heard).
233. Tinker v. Des Moines Cmty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(stating that "student's rights ... do not embrace merely the classroom hours").
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officials, students will know the nature of their community. They
will be the ultimate judges of the truth with respect to their own
experiences. If the school-based police achieve the SRO ideal and
establish the pervasive yet light, almost benevolent, touch they
seek, Miranda's restrictions will rarely be needed. If, on the
other hand, school and police officials operate in a united and
confrontational fashion toward students, the students will not
need a court to clue them in. Rules that pretend that school-
based law enforcement can never be unduly coercive will not fool
them. The adoption of rules that acknowledge the students'
reality, however, is apt to do more than any civics text to
demonstrate the legitimacy of authority.
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